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German interest in the nations of East Central Europe dates
back for centuries* However, since the nineteenth century this in-
terest has assumed a hegemonic nature. Economically this area has
been of great importance to Germany and culturally, the hundreds of
thousands of German nationals that have lived in enclaves through-
out the area since the Middle Ages form strong links with Germany.
In World War II the suppression of this area by the Nazis is
well-known, and in the post war period the majority of Germans
located in present day West Germany has been separated from the Bast
by the Iron Curtain*
The purpose of the thesis is to discover the nature and ex-
tent of contemporary West German relations \-&th Bast Central Europe.
This topic is justified by the fast that no study has been made in
this area. In view of the historical interest that Germans have had
in eastern affairs, it is logical to assume that this interest lias
not disappeared even in today* s divided world.
Some definitions are required for the sake of clarification*
The area referred to has been called East Central Europe, a term
coined by Professor Oscar iialecki in his book: Borderlands of Western
Civilisation : A History of East Central Europe.1 On the first page
*Mew Xorkt The Ronald Press Company, 1952*
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of Chapter I \m defines the area, as licdted t . / a line
extt .voden south to Italy anc it east *ssian
and Turkish borders. In this thesis this area has been reduced
somewhat to include the lands of Western a
Rumanians and ;Iagyars or, in oti*er words, tits preeent day satellite
nations and Yugoslavia, but excluding East Germany* The omission
of becomes ainiost a necessity ainee its contact wi:
West Gcriuany comprises a completely separate issue of free „ny
versus Germany.
For the sake of brevity and. variet irrj&ne xj-
caaionally been referred to as "'ierjaaas"
«
irely
mentioned and when it does appear, there is no dc
Germany is intended.
In reference- s organisation jsis, a general
progress! ve to the positive mmh attest tea.
After a siiort historical background, setting the stage as it were,
a review of atween West
Genaany a antral Europe has oeen underU <en. It is neeea*
to know just what they are, their import
a
canoe in order to unders' .tione
wit :3ast.







Germany, the attitude of the satellite governments toward West Ger-
many and the attitudes toward West Germany of East European emigre's
as representative of the populations who cannot express themselves
freely.
The remainder of the thesis is devoted to a chronological
approach to the attempts by West Germany to have dealings with
East Central Europe in the fields of politics, economics and
human relationships* f the three chapters in this section the
first covers the time period from 1949-1955 when West Germany was
under allied occupation, but with an internal government and acme
authorised activities in international affairs*
The second time period, to which a chapter is devoted,
covers the granting of sovereignty in 1955 until the expiration
of office of the third Bundestag and cabinet in 1961. During
this period foreign affairs were guided by Chancellor Adenauer
assisted by Dr. Heinrich von Brentano as Foreign Minister.
The third and final chapter devoted to actual relations
covera the time period from the autumn of 1961 to the present,
during which Dr. Gerhart: eder became Foreign ^Sinister.
The frsmewor? has purposely been narrowed to include
only West German relations with Bast Central Europe since
1949 in order to examine the interaction between the two areas.
However, in the next to the last chapter this framework has been
expanded to include the European setting as there are developments
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here that impinge on the subject under discussion.
He published studies of West Gerrcan-East Central European
relationships have so far been introduced in the United States
,
end baaed on information available in this country, it appears
that none has been published in Europe. West German interest in
eastern affairs is very high* but no general survey appears to
have been undertaken. Of course, from a historian f s point
view such a topic is too close to the present, but from the view-
point of a political scientist this type of subject offers con-
siderable food for thought and discussion. Thus, it is hoped
that the following survey will contribute t a gap that
has been hitherto neglected.
In conclusion, some remarks are reserved lor sources of
information. All material was gathered in the United States, al-
though a mash more thorough study might have been conducted had
the opportunity arisen to carry on research in West Germany,
Hence the title of tills thesis is phrased as a survey. This is
also the reason for such a preponderance of secondary material
in the bibliography. The New York Times and the London Times have
been utilised quite extensively inasmuch as these newspapers are
nearly the only ones with indices. It is believed that consider-
able valuable newspaper information and cosofisent both here and
abroad is wasted for lack of indexing, although there have been
recent minor changes in this direction, -ics and perio
" ' i*M»C "oil ' * 9V'
aw© *c




listed usually cover this subject matter only incidentally as a side
issue; the whole research effort has bean directed toward synthesis*
ing a mass of inforsational details into a comprehensive and cop*-
prehensible wholo.
In addition, considerable valuable information has been
gained from interviews with an official of the German Embassy in
Washington* D.C., and from interviews with three emigre leaders
from East Central Europe. Of course, one night ell challenge
the accuracy and objectivity of the contributions of the three
emigres, although highly placed in their present erdgre' organiza-
tions or in previous free gorarraaents of their respective nations*
However, with the resent difficulty of aeeertalnlii£ the outlook
of the non-comnunist populations in tail >s, their remarks are
eonsidered to be highly valuable* The questions posed to them in-
eluded reference to such subjective matters as the attitudes and
feelings of the non-eoaounist East European* toward present 4
west Germany, Thus, the interview teciudque is considered to be
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CHAPTER II
A x^IS Of' GER:> 3t
The history of German relations with East Central Europe
dates back to the migrations at the time of the fall of Rome, when
Teutons and 31avs cxme into contact with one another. 3 be-
tween the two groups have generally b99tt inimical. In this chapter
only the most important aspects of the relations between Germany and
East Central Europe will be touched upon in order to present. >-
ground that will provide some perspective for evaluation and analysis
of preeent day relations.
German Traditions in Eastern Policies in Jentury
For centuries a cleavage existed between the Germanic pec
in Central Europe and the Slavs in East Central Europe, Prior to and
during the Napoleonic era Poland ceased to exist as an independent
state as a result of the partitions of this country in 1772, .1793
1795* After the Napoleonic interlude the peace makers at the -ess
of Vienna tried to turn ?ck back to the status quo
which resulted in the constant suppression of nationalism and liberal-
ism among the psoples of East Central. Europe, a situation that was
to prevail during the nineteenth century. Generally speaking the
Western and Southern Slavs in East Central a were under the dom-
ination of an Eastern Slav, the Russian czar, ans, the
Austrian Emperor and the Prussian ase must be added
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one trend in German foreign policy, namely to look beyond Seat Central
Europe and conclude agreements with Russia at the expense of the
peoples in between* The results of these would, of course, affect
the Western Slavs far more than the s inasmuch as the
latter would be gee Loally on the peri This trend of
bridging Seat Central 7-urope can be documented up to recent times
and it is apparent in the thinking of many Germans in the contem-
porary period &s will be shown later*
The second trend in German foreign policy is that of Germany
concluding agreements with neighboring states in the east, directed
against Russia in an attempt to stem Russian westward expansile
trends, Poland was the most likely partner for this type of agree-
ment. Although the Instances developing this trend are fewer, it
appears in German thinking today. An early example of this trend
occurred in the revolutionary year of 1848 when a new minister of
foreign affairs in Prussia, Baron if, von Arnim, favored the idea of a
Polish leader, Ludwlk liierosX&waki, starting a war against czarist
taatd ,
Another example of the opposite trend in the nineteenth cen-
tury occurred in 1663 when Prussia aligned herself with Russia during
the Polish insurrection and promised cooperation In the ^Ivensleben
Convention. This understanding w asia served Germany well in
the Franco-German war of 1870-71. A few years later Uismarci: achieved
additional understanding by concluding the so-called fteinsuranoe Treaty
into* itmmO nt btvns too
IX-0 Mi
IWith Ratal* in 1387 which, however, mu to last for only three years.
Before leaving the nineteenth century another phsno—non oust
be crural nod namely the growth of Pan-Germaniata and PaivSiavian'..
In the revolutionary year of 1*1*8 a Pan-Slavic Congress con-
vened in Prague create independent goverar or flavin
people in the «ustr ogarian empire. I unifying drive of
Slavb was an expression of isurpressed nationalism following the
Congress of /ienna period. Of course, these tendencies were crust,
but oany Slavs in East Central Europe expected t *ra-
tion would corae from Russia.
whe Geraan side similar trends can be uoted, ttewever# in
the last century, Austria remained separated fr<m Germany
after 1371 was united. However, the nationalistic trend of Pan*
Germanism in a sense has persisted into the twentieth century when
it was ox .sloited by .Jazi ideology. It is neat important in this study
to note over since the ,<iddle Ages substantial pocket. .z?~
mans existed in nearly all of the countries of Mast Cer »,
thus giving German natlonali*a a latent resource again exploited by
Hitler. Since World ' ur IX these enclaves have all :>an elifl&na-
ted, but their existence he* et bee
To return to ti. boportanoe lias




9On the whole it can be said that Pajislaviam was chiefly a
sentiment expressing common Slav hostHit/ against Gerraany; it
was not a positive element of unity among the Slavs, and least
of all was It an incentive to accepting Russian hegemony. 1
what is of import to this study is that hostility against
Germany is deeprooted and that this hostility generated Slav unity
to some extent.
mBBL sJShESK AMsJmm
The two trends resented above can be discerned in interwar
affairs as well. The formation of a bridge over Poland occurred when
the two outcasts from polite international society concluded tlie
Rapallo Treaty in 1922 and a neutrality treaty in !
In 1934 Nasi Germany concluded a non-agression treaty with
Poland showing an example of the opposite trend* Five years later
the reverse took place when Hitler concluded a non-agression pact
with the USSR which wis to have a detrimental effect on several
nations in between Germany and Russia, inasmuch as East Central
r>e was carved up between the two. Of course, it must be
realized that these changes must be viewed from • oader frame-
work of interwar European politics when si' realignments caused
the exchange of international partners. It le us to not
even today German-Soviet coopc
the USSR, when the latter would like to wean V«est Germany away from
^Hajo
->llapt








NATO. he ideas • •• underlying the Rapallo Treaty are still va
today,"2 a iioviet newspaper has stated.-*
In regard to Germans living in East Central Europe, this
situation posed many problems, However, the Germans were not the
only minority in East Central i.urope after the peace settlements
following World War I. treaties were intended t' .ct
se nationals who were living outside their homeland. le ad-
vent of iiitier, German minorities were to play a more important role.
Nazi race doctrine developed super feelings amonf unaans
to the detriment of those nations having Germt /ities. The
Sudeten Genoans in CsechoSlovakia land are
well-k iwns i. ;r»s schemes. Furthermore, other irrEden-
tist groups were exploited* CM example will suffice, that of ftgr.
Tiso^ Slovak reople*s Party; this group under Tiso gained iodcpen-
dence for Slovakia under German protection after tin of Checho-
slovakia in March of 1939.
World War II and its Consequences
In World War II Hitler brought to fruition several of his a
cepts. One of the better known is th .obensrav,
2N. Polyanov, it of ftapall risen Times,"
11 16, 1957, p. 4, as i in
_. XX, no. 15 "." ;4.
"
tese two trends are urn analysed by La
baum in "German Easter Ley, Xeeterday and Tomorr
Affairs (fmdor;;, vol. 31, ao. , ,4.
-.V
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territorial acquisitions would alleviate population concer. ons in
Germany particularly at the exoense of East Central Europe and Russia.
The experiences of the nations in tnis area testify to the execution
of tiiis foreign policy.
Another concept linked wit _a idea wai^ of
^srauBwirt schart i the systematic execution,
tlve nations would contribute tc the 1 development
Third Reich, This economic exploitation further affected Eas
tral Europe detrimentally, some nations -sore than othe
In reviewing the actions of the Allies &v
several important decisions affecting East Central Europe were made*
la the Atlantic rter of August 14, 1941. sident of
the United States and the Prime Minister of Gre«. shed "to
see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have
been forcibly deprived of theaun
Several years later at the Yalta Conference, held from February
4 to 11, 1945, the Big Three issued in their Protocol of the proceed-
ings a "Declaration on liberated ilkrope" wherein it was stated that
Um three Allied governments would assist *the peoples of the former
Axis satellite states in I.uropc to solve by democratic means tk
pressing political and economic problems*"* is well known one
oaauelo Langsa







3olvedH the problems of East Central Europe by iapos
the rule of coEsnunisHu
all the nations in East Central rated
so many problems for the /lilies as Poland, and in this ct the
future lc iish borders f as six
weeks after the German invasion of the Soviet Union an a r«ement was
signed between the Polish government in exile he
Soviet govenxnent wherein the Masi
earlier, was repudiated. Although no mention of coundaries was made
in this agreement, the London Poles assumed that is
repudiation rec y ques-
tion plagued all Allied nestings throughout tno war.
Ultimately, Poland as a whole was shifted wer> ©wax
Polish eastern provinces were eeded to the Soviet ind
was compensated in the west by absorbing prewar German territory east
of the Oder and lusatian Neisse rivers. Carta ions were
attached as revealed in the Potsdam Pre >f 1945.
. .. The Three Heads of Government real ieir opinion that
the final delir i the wester ild
await the peaee settleme.
,
.;• Three Heads of ameat
determination of Poland's wester
territories east
west of Swinastunde, ..
ence of the weste;










to the Czechoslovak frontier, . .. s • under the adsinistra-
tion of the Polls! and for sue oses should .
asidered as part of the Soviet aone of occupation in German/*
'
L« border has become one of the major international issues
between East and West. s pet ft© peace treaty v .ias been
see border has attune ely a
e permanent Iter* H tiie tl-ae of the otadaa once,
the Roc. was in gitn throughout the whole Sasi
area which gave a fait accompli aspect to t
.iorence.
Another issue which caused a major disturbance was the trans-
fer of German minorities out of East Central ,sdam
oocol reads as follows on this matter:
The Three Governments, having considered the question in all
its aspects, recognise th&t the transfer to Germany of Gere
populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Csechc-
slovukia. ungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree
tfeet the transfers that take ^lace should be effected in an
orderly and humane manner.®
The population transfers were generally anyt* I humane and
deaeript^. Germans participatin oratio-r. ;ate that
the treatment of hum&r
'Langsam, oj3. jg p# 12
8 Ibid ., p. 128.
'a good oollsctiori of expellee r
.eder (ed,
itori -
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it must be rsissrabtrsd that at this point human values in East Central
Europe had regressed to a pre-civilijiation status as evidenced only
too well by Nasi tyranny*
m population transfers actually started before the end of
the war because many Germans wanted to avoid remaining in territories
th*t would be occupied by the Red Army. Jn toto. the number of Ger-
mans expelled from East Central Europe exceeds ten million; an exact
count is difficult to obtain due to lack of precise figures, thus,
a situation that had existed for hundreds of years had been re*
versed. Nevertheless, there still exist enclaves of Germans in Kast
Central Europe. The largest group is located in Rumania amounting
10
to some 200,000. Others are located in Poland, Czechoslovakia and
Hungary precipitating negotiations at a later date. German expellees
and refugees had become a major political force in West Germany
inasmuch as it constitutes about one-fifth of the population of that
nation and also about a fifth of the voting population.
The history of West Gcrman-JBaet Central European relations
is epitomised by a series of disharmonious events. . vorlaop.
ethnic situations, dating bask centuries, were almost eliminated
after World War II, but the events of World War II occurred within the
life span of this generation. Consequently, the memory of these
*0Joseph B. Scheehtman, "Postwar Population Transfers in
rope. A Survey, "The Review of Politics, vol. 15, no. 2 (April 1953),
p. 176.














•vents and of the arrogance of a self-created Herrenyolk linger on.
Boundary issues created further problems which still exist today.
The Oder-,teles© frontier is a major issue although it oust be kept
in mind that frontier issues exist among the satellites and also be-
tween them and the Soviet Union although the rule of cesnunism has
had somewhat of an anesthetic effect on these border issues and
other issues as well, inside the communist bloc*
This liietory of negative international relations between
West Germany and East Central Europe oust be kept in mind when
analyzing present day relations. As will be seen in the next
chapter there are circumstances and situations which tend to exert
e mutually repellent effect upon West Crtrmmy and the satellite
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• FTER III
ON 3 TO WKST Qmm - EAST CENTKk flEAN RELATIONS
Nations geographically adjacent to on* another cannot but
have come type of mutual relationships* Examples of complete
Isolation by a state are not too common in modern times, and at-
tempts to achieve this have generally not been successful* There
always appears to be some degree of interdependence in the community
of nations. The extent to which good neighbor relations are de-
veloped depends upon many factors. In the case of VJest Germany and
East Central Europe the elaboration of mutually satisfactory rela-
tions is subject to a number of obstacles many of which are not
ordinarily present in the Interstate relations of other nations*
In the case of West Germany these impediments have resulted from
fcorld War H or the Cold Mtr. Since they form the framework, as it
were, for contemporary relations, they should be given close scrutiny;




A number of conflict provoking issues ere prevalent in
two areas* Upon consideration of territorial foundations, v. est
Germany as a sovereign has been deprived of considerable terri-
tory which she maintains to be hers* This results from the fact
that the Soviet sone and the territories east of the Oder-Jieisse
line lis beyond her jurisdiction* Any geographical aspirations
y^i
ItMMM tih * ;ok i(LCMMtf|
( ". 7 M mm
bic JWW fill •*« •'
mmtm
tan* *w
-fit Wl. MOJ« A '
.1' tj • :xe. on >lWi fii
lMa)dttlft •rtJ -KfC/u/l laajjaaK
Joat/lcaj ajt
10 aaja> W..' fll
Vm*$H>4RB9 "tol t a*ISVf
lw mk*«ii© •Mi
m
.mtS a*, iavoa a «* vt**-i*0
MNflgad mil wJI
17
the East Central European peoples may have in relation to Germany
are rather well cheeked by communist hegemonic rule; however,
territorially speaking those nations neighboring Qermany would
more likely wish to retain what i,hey now possess* Thus, there is
a conflict of revisionism versus status quo * In the area of
nationalism, feelings against each other still run high especially
in the nations close to Germany in view of the iistorical exper-
iences each side has had* Furthermore, there are racial, rel.
social and cultural differences between the Germans and the Slavs*
One of the major issues which has generated conflict is 1
ideological one* Communist rule is stopped by a demarkation line
that runs through the center of Europe in the form of the ir
curtain which tendr to increase international pressure on each
side. West Germany borders on this demarkation line as does
Chechoslovakia while Poland is geographically adjacent, but with
last Germany as a buffer. Moreover« the nations on the east side
of the iron curtain are subject to Soviet domination* Thus, if
relations between west Germany and £ast Central Europe resulting
from the latest world conflagration are to be repaired, each side
has to operate with more strikes against it from the onset*
Ma.1or Impedimenta Created by a£
A number of situations have arisen as a resul d Jar
II and the Cold War as was observed earlier. One of the major
issues is the reunification issue in West Germany*
«J*
9bXB .t»ftft
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The Reunification issue* Whether the reunification of Ger-
many Kill be effected depends not 00 much upon German efforts as
It doe: . - Soviet agreement in addition iaary
consideration whether such a reunification would be :.ional
interest or loth great powers. Should this occur many East
peans may fear a resurgent German Reich although they no
agree that the present division is unnatura: . vx?v»r, ? case
of Poland and, to a lesser degree, Chechoslovakia the question there
arises concerning how Jfcr to the east ernans would reunify,
Potsdam Protocol gave the pre-World }*ar H territories east
of the Qder-Meisse rivers to Poland for he
a peace settlement could be tea. iefcenlande are
/
covered in such an international agreement, oern over
future German acquisition of the Sudet© 3 less alar In
West Genaany the leaders of the nation realise to a large degree
the unreality of effecting reunification, and this issue is usually
dormant exeer>t at election time when politi -^apt to gain
the refugee and expellee vote and thus, allow themselves im
campaign premises that, of course, cannot always be fulfilled. These
groups of people appear in L s major political parties, the
istian Democrats and the nocrats, and this affects t
campaign platfom on both sides,
ier-Neisse frontier . Closely allied e reunifica-
tion problem, t oisse frontier constitutes a s>
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that is of major importance in reference to the development of eu-
tually satisfactory relations between West Germany and Poland* The
background of this issue has been presented* The East German state,
not recognised in the west, has concluded an agreement >dth Poland
stating that these rivers will constitute the border. This was
done on November WOg at Corlitz, In Mm seller
Adenauer has repeatedly stated since 1953 that "the problems con-
nected with the Oder-ftelsae line are not to ived by force, but
exclusively by peaceful means*"1
The statements contained in the Potsdam Protocol regarding
the future disposition of the ex-German territories east of these
rivers represent the official oosition of the ovenassnts al-
though this border has gradually assumed an aura of permanence*
Furthermore, the Germans argue that it iff unlawful to detach terri-
tory from a state from the viewpoint of international morality £j 7]
that international law outlaws annexations; populations have the
right of self-determination; and that mass exnulsion is il
^Walter Hubatsch, Die deut: , . loets,
1961), p. 172} and Goettincen Resea
Territory s. treat* Rslen raubert and tani ftoke thee
Holsner, 1?57), p* 141.
2Xoltr.
Problem gj ; --•• ,
*
,,
I960), p. 177 at. soq *
•rtT »faMvi«4 bn* ymmt s*tf tt*. *i . •» * tLLur<#
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The West Germans also complain that the Poles want West Gem**.
3
recognise a border tht is not one of West Germany's.
nent appears weak when one consider? that the preamble Gemma
jtitution - the Basic Law * states, Inter alia, that the German
people in the Lander In est Germany, when enacting this basic law,
"also actod on behalf of those Genr-ans to whor.
nied,"** i.e., the Soviet zone and refugees and expelles from the
East. : oreover, the West Germ
le as well*
The Polish government has argued siost fervently for the fi-
nality of this border. Referr er mentioned Potsdam
Protocol the words rt former* and "adninistr were stressed to
imply a cession of territory and, consequently, a peace treaty con-
I
ference would merely be a formality* The communist *e?dmes of
East Germany and the USSR, both under Stalin and *Q w, have
rigidly expounded this view and the permanence of this border re-
mains indisputable anong communist governments. te of the
hte, Joerg Kastl, first Secretary, German Embassy, Washir:
ton, . . in on interview at the Embassy rch 11, 1963* herein-
after cited as the Kastl Interview c_
^Federal Republic of Germany, Federal Foreign Office, Ger-
many's Position unde? -onaX j-aw , 'So !.
n.n. 9 1961), e* 10.
oles/aw vaewiora, Pol:
point of itional Law (a<
Wydawnictwo Zach? fete* : 59), pp. passim.
-afrit* * »••;•»• o£i
o.st BMl a-?
ate*? ton»2ir«Mi -w'Jt* Ml







slight independence gained from the singe the new Polish
leader Gooi^ka also has taken the sane posi In a apt
given at Posnan in 1957, he said that only "the Soviet Union oan
guarantee the Gder-Hcisse frontier, "° Professor Mt .
aiders the oorder probler ie of four salie
factors restraining ;d from straying too far from the coraou-
nist fold, ;'';:. other Uiree factors are ge Isol&t
economic int. e Warsaw Pac
The growth of West Germany, her i ;;©
presence of wee t*ocps
iitatlon of general
have 05 . ited to Polish :;uieasiness over the border issue. The
Polish government is, of course, well aware of the Western posi-
tion concerning the ultimate establishment rder via an
all-German peace treaty. Thus, whenever the question arises
officially or unofficially in the West, t wernment
usually reacts by raising queries, objections and demands for
clarification,
Althou provinces between ier-Neisse rivers
the 1937 German border in the east comprised one
stated sonea in World War n, Poland has been si ite
"Iteadlir
York), Poland, , 5,
7zbigniew K. zinefc
(revised •«, .. .; Hew r! : hrcdor-...' T ."" ..-
9b j a-
and develop them doubtleesl uncertain statue.
In the laet few years this area ha *ted
through acceleration of reconst re than on®
present popul .»re b .?re ai. rid




Cat. .-ate ©.' ordinal iV/sz, i-
nent advocate onizat s disp order terri-
tories, no doubt the only goal he shares
Prior to World War II a c :.ween i -r-
the a >ps
enaaay was subj :
3 the eminent issued a similar decree requirl
Polish governmei: val of Romar.




merit, arid it is realized that as I
more and ikely . \e dis
refugee organizations and their importance as joerts
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a potent influence upon for~
tailor German for< ollcy t -jmeda* now, re-
gaining the territories lost le east Lsse line
although, as fedora
well being 1 rope,
satisfied and
terest. As an att-G
Tor1.. iarea
territories, yes, even about reunification with Just a re-
signed shoulder-s:
A somewi /lew was
by the Protestant sm
was draft protestant lead;
advocating the acc<- of the Gder-Heisa
•melioration of relations wj s#°
3 view perhaps underscores atonement fc
anything else, and is - prose
by soao, while othere it it made a artr »
-brecht assel, "Pert 1-
politik," .na Vterner
Ricnter, ] , is-
3 fror. purees have
been aade by the authr „
ipeh 25;
10
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It must also be realised ti
Germans are more like .. h
12
-id with more equanimity then their eld< ally,
3t German economic ooora
Germany and in the present prosperity many
are ouch better off now Kate] ±n they were earlier.
(jjer
East Central Kurope has es.




II. At the tine of 1 : Lausanne la-
ment was a
Minorities. the removal of nany far
II has been considered as ar 3 type
the difference is that this lattej on was tj.-
tion«
In .section the *e of
Sight to Homeland" or to
considered b;
.
beyond the scope is sur
-r applicabilit;
12»ilome Trut isreci,




estrins .na been developed by the Germans and they
t it can be traced to the Hague Convention n and
(1907), the Atlantic ..), the preamble m Charter




{19U8) and the Geneva Agreements (1*44). As just m
tioned this is a 1 Lved human right tailored Lt the
Lre for return that expelles are bound to feel*
been uprooted fr*M locales I ope where Cta
had been living for centuries this aspiration is undere-
Furthermore, Le liv.
standard in comparison tc jr-
tain are-.
t the word Ilsiisat carriei
"home", but also a non-translatable & environmsnt
region surround" 3*s hoaestead*
ses ai lies not clieve
recht as a doctrine or t.
ht. demand ueoret atiply
as the popul rows.
Another legal doctrine crea-
se called iiallstein-! doctrine, safe-
guard or an impediment dt
13
. , aikert, f




Nevertheless, many would agree that it represents a hindrance. Pro-
fessor hallstein, a former West German Secretary of State, now
Chairman of the Commission of the European Economic Coonunlty lend©
hie name to the thesis whieh postulates that the f©derai government
of West Germany will not establish diplomatic relations v.
government that entertains formal diplonsatic relations wit
East German regime, this is also applicable in a situation where
west Germany has diplomatic ties with a state that decides to recog-
1*.
nlse East Germany, in whieh ease west Germany will sever relations,*^
This occurred in 1957 when Tito recognised Hast Germany, and west
Germany severed diplomatic relatione. One exception to this ;.loo-
trine now exists inasmuch as Weet Qmemny and the Soviet Union
have diplomatic relations with each other. It is argued in west
Germany that the USSR, as a victor and one of the great powers of
.>orld War II "shares competence for German problems*"^
the reasons for this doctrine have been expounded in the
following manner. If the west German government had not created
this doctrine the existence of the East German regime or the "D.
I* USSRLaiasgLatf^»»=
The author of this book recently was west Germany*s Ambassador
to the United States and speaks authoritatively on German foreign
policy due to his close relations with its formulatore in vest
Germany*
met Friedlander, "The Road to Warsaw," g»stc
vol, 2, no, 12 (December, 1959), p. 39*
ft
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as abbreviated in Qeraan, would be strengthened. This in turn,
could lead to the recognition of the Oder-8eiese frontier and a
valuable bargaining point in a future peace conference would be
forfeited. Furthermore, if the Hallstein Doctrine were non-
existent and West Germany were to establish diplomatic relations
with the satellite governments, this might possibly encourage other
nations in the free world to do likewise* Consequently, a or-
ation of East Qeraan embassies would appear in the capitole c
world. Conceivably, the question of aojadssic ermanics to
the United Nations could occur since one ieregard one in
favor of the other. ird consequence of not u Istein
xrine would be that any opposition. CJenaany or in the
satellite nations for that matter would be daaorallsed . , lally,
if the restraints of the Hallstein Doctrine were non-existent the
DDR would gain intern tional status, and the c r-
ference in a nation's internal affairs in accordance with inter-
national law would ensue. 1**
This doctrine has been subject to a great deal of criticism
in West Germany. It has been argued -ctrine has "ira-
posed a political self-blocade with legal weapons***^ Many West








Germans argue that its government should remember that even bloc
countries, although with Soviet support, can elect to establish
diplomatic relations with other nations of their choosing, and
any tendencies in this direction should not be discouraged.
Furthermore, the Mallstoin octrine dating back to December of
1955 should be re-evaluated since it now, i.e. eight years later,
may be advantageous to establish formal relations with nations to
the east* As an analogy they point to the situ tL .cd
States and Bed China where the fonrer doss not recognise the
latter. However, the United States does not sever relations with
those nations that do so. To some extent these arguments seem to
be delineated by party lines and the government opposition favors
its rescission. Nevertheless, any foreseeable change in this o.
trine is not likely to occur.-^
*r??9*&§ i2£ denuclearised and/or acajllfoarfrged sonjsJLn
Central Europe . In an effort to attempt to break down the rigid
barriers between east and west in Central Europe a number of plans
have been proposed. The best known of these is the Eaoaeki Plan
named after the foreign minister of Poland. This plan, first r
oitted to the General Assembly in the fall of 1957, envisioned a
denuclearised zone in western Europe, encompassing East and west
Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. This plan combined Polish and
Soviet interests, and it has been pointed out that the Poles in
particular would benefit from it because it would undermine the














hold of Soviet troops in Poland and, at Lhe sane time, weaken Ger-
many because of an imposed weapons ban coupled with foreign in-
spection. ' However, this argument is quite debatable. The Ger-
man reaction was indicated officially by Chancellor Adenauer who
by and large expressed public opinion when he stated that "this would
mean the end of R&XO and we want to hold on to SATO."20 Addition-
ally, it was argued in Germany that the* execution of this plan would
only solidify the boundary between East and West Germany as these
two entities would be the main custodians of the atom-free sone.
However, many Social Democrats, trade union officials and the
22
Evangelical Church supported the plan.
A similar pi*** «** proffered in 1 y the Vfcst Geman
Social Democrats calling for a nuclear-free "non-tension sone" in
Central Europe, Geographically, this sone would encompass the
same nations as the Hapackl Plan. In this plan betn NATO and the
Warsaw Pact would withdraw their forces from this area while the
•^Huey Louis Kostanick, Poland * Geography for Disaster,
"
Current History, vol. 36, no. 212 (April, 1959), P« 209.
2°Heinrich von Siegler (ed, ), Documentation zur h-
landafrage. Hauptband II (second complete and enlarged edition;
Bonn i Siegler and Co. KG., 1961), p. 316.
^ilhelm Wolfran m Initiatives for a New
Age} A German View," Foreign Affaire , vol, 36, I,
»), p. U ,
^Karl W. Deutech and Lewis J. '.'.dinger, Germany Ke.loins







United States and the USSR wart to guarantee its existence.
However, this plan also ran against political reaUt las
beeoas a asre debating issue*
J-rY^-t gejlUt <a -?-vvv gyp ff ?,¥ 'iiSS. '.-
A psychological obstacle to the asselioratlon of relations
between West Gemsny and East Central ivurope has resulted f rosa the
treatraent of the local populations by the Maai eeeup&tion forces*
Memories of their brutalities persist and the cunaaanist regimes
capitalise on these memories as a warning to their
a rearmed NATO-allied West Germany wn is a threaten*
neighbor* ,'iowever, it atust be kept in adnd that this feeling
is not equally as prevalent throughout East
nations closest to Germany* Poland and Ossechoslovakia, suffered
most as is well known while Hungary, Runaaia and Sfcilgaria were Has!
allies and fared better* However* resistance groups appeared in the
bast Central European nations conquered by Has! Germany* ng
through the fifties trials of World War II Has! war criminals have
taken place notably in Poland schoslovai* la* Consequently, the
two nations that ideally should be the ihare plans with West
Germany for interstate relations because of geographic*, by*
the two which have cause bo express the most grievances against it*
23Hubatseh, og* ej&., pp* 31-32«
>4m :w ww wi>- aftfe
flJii tfM mffi
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In addition to basic differences between Gerssanic and Slavic
peoples, 'est QgfMMp lad the nations of Bast . v: :- ivayvj -<; ,,r-
subject to further iraoedtiraem
.
.actor? r
two, These obstacles are both
hostility generated by the Nasi war Machine should diminish as a new
generation replaces the older jrieneed it, although
much of the corssinist propaganda trie eep it alive. . ub-
lsa of the xier-Heisse fr . :dnisnes in acerbity in ^Jest Ger-
many also through the passage of tine, the f the nation
and the waning interest of a younger generation of both West Germans
and German expellee. Is time, per i,rend might affect
the Hcimatsrccht Doctrine. The rerun,fie. t ion issue has become mors
and more a nacre debating point si eruianieB are pro-
gressively assuming a mere permanent eharactr- i side issue of
just how far east reunification ought t reas becomes equally
debatable. Thus, in general, except In regarv allstein
rine, which so far has remained static, a status of t;








wan a .a-it«s r,:./x- roi ah *ce . .:; aim
.TEAL EUUDFE
In spits of the impedimente discussed and describe
previous chapter the West German government does ioraulate and
publicize foreign policy toward the East. This chapter will de-
fine this policy and, additionally, attempt to ascertain various
views on Dm position of teat Germany vis-4iHvis Eastern Europe*
The v ried outlooks to be covered include those of West German
officialdom, of diverse private opinion -vxty, of
satellite governments and, finally, of -Emigres from
Europe, insofar as this is possible to ascert;
west German Foreign Policy
In 1949 the German Basic law was adopted as a oonstlttiti
and a federal German government began t i under the three
western H. .imlssioners. T Paris
>rds of 1954 and accession t any assumed
full sovereign status. Any forei existing du: Is
period will be more closely discussed in the next chapter. ytsr,
West Germany's foreign policy was formulated a Les*
The chief policy formulation group in the arman
ment is made up of the chancellor s cabinet. ollor,










rather dominant jposition. Ho has been described as a vary stro
willed man who wants "man who are willing to execute ills inatructlone
unreservedly." x One cabinet sdnister, ths Federal Minister for
Bundearat affairs, Dr. vr .-•,, discovered this whan he criti-
cized Adenauer's policy of failing to establish diplomatic relations
with Poland and Czechoslovakia • Adenauer cowaented by ***>
"cabinet jsinisters have no right to dance out of line, aaauer's
foreign sdnister 1955-1Vol, Dr. Heinrich von Sreatano, including
some of his staff was also on occasion reprimanded for entertain-
ing independent ideas, Adenauer has stated that he was "particularly
displeased with a section of the Ministry which strongly favors
closer relationships with Poland and Czechoslovakia."^
To a great extent Geratan forei icy has been directed
toward the west. However, West Germany and the Soviet Union have
established diplomatic relations with each other, the Hallstein
Doctrine notwithstanding, as explained in the previous chapter.
These relations were developed shortly after West Germany became
a fully sovereign nation in 1955 soon after the Qmmra msm±t con-
ference, but Defore the October meeting that ended in failure when
^Gerald rareund, Germany Between Kast and West (New S
Hareourt, Bra* . 7Tp* 13.
2The Times (London), June 8, 1956, p. 10, The eigh











the foreign Ministers of the Big Four attempted to settle all the
knotty issues referred to them by the earlier summit xaeetinr. As
will be discussed in more detail later, West Germany has had diplo-
matic relations with Yugoslavia.
Adenauer* s second and present foreign minister, Dr. Ger-
hard Schroedar, took office in the fall of 1961. foreign pol.
statements do not differ markedly between the two as can be ex-
pected according to the earlier description wieellor Adenauer.
Dr. Wilhelm Grewe, one of von Brentano's as ;ssed
the general goals of Genaan foreign policy as follows
$
1. Regaining state sovere in
foreign affairs.
2.. Secur
affairs both a e danger of
50) and against the danger of a coa» ' I
from outside (such as the Prague coup, 19A * especially secur
of Berlin against each atte
3. The res+ >f Germany's state , especially
the reunification of Western and Ct
of Germany; the restituti trXin i ;le
as the capital of Germany j and the territorial consolidation
of the German state territory through a free3 i.ed
peace treaty on the principle of a friendly understanc
with neighboring peoples over the knotty Border questions.
4* The strengthen! free
tegration and politi operation . cohesion into the
closest knit federated cor .*
The exl^ncies of the cold war have prevented West
from achieving its goals in Item three above.
\R* eit. . p. 13,
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item West Germany, with one exception, is a member of all the
economic and sdlitary intemationai organizations in which western
European nations participate* For example , West Germany is a mca-
ber of Nni'C and the Cosmunities of the Six while she w A, of
course, be a member of the rival organisation of the Comaon Market,
namely the European Free Trade Associate
after having examined the general goals of Y/est Ocr
policy, it is necessary to determine wl- als West Germany has
set for herself in the ease of easte ips. Of interest is
Ambassador Grows* s analysis and far is re-
spect. He db9mnr*9 t. .a three problems in the
east* The first is West Germany* a position vlsHk-vis the ! et
Union. The twenty ad
status of Berlin serve to r, nobler; .,:>.
tance. The second problem involves the quest i Just wh&i
of relations to have with Poland and Czechoslovakia* closest
neighbora to the east. With Poland there is the earlier discussed
"knotty border questions'* while w' choslovakia does
not have any official border issues although the Sudete .ix-
pellees would think otherwise. The third problem dealt *r
nations in East Central Eur ugoslavi/
Hungary} Albania if iered too di JSt rmany
that there are no outstanding political questions m
tions, uut t :mber of financial e<zd to
be resolved 3 demands for settlement of occupation damages,
etc. However, it has been sol u as far as trade is
mm
IQMHPfl lWfl ^^






concerned, West Germany has centered her present relations with
East Central Europe around this field of endeavor, a theme that
wiU. be evident in later chapters, J
Based on these problems the goals of West Germany's eastern
policy are considered to be as follows t
1. First and foremost, it must be reckoned that the freedom
and security of the Federal Republic and -vest Berlin has to be
guarded from ccramunist aggression and other forms of extension
of conaunist hegemony (subversion, infiltration, etc.)
2. We cannot abandon seventeen million Germans in central
Germany i»e, the Soviet acne and we cannot resign ourselves to a
lasting division of Germany.
3. we must foster friendly relatione with our eastern
neighbors and rogulate our disputes through negotiation and
L
4. We must live with the Soviet Union,
'
To some extent these goals have been part: eved al-
though complete fulfillment would necessitate a major political
rearrangement involving the great powers. Of interest is the belief
of the German government that diplomatic relations are not neces-
sarily the only means for inter-nation intercourse. It realizes,
however, th?*t no diplomatic relations with East Central ivuropean
governments are a drawback, but it considers the Hallstein Doctrine
overriding* Thus, in place of diplomatic relations, consular
5Ibid„ pp, 00-414, passim,
6ibid., pp. 414-U5.
ted* mm *mmmm to I i*4 haft** m&m*
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missions, trad* missions, and multipurpose negotiating teams can
be utilised.7
Dr* Gerhard Schroeder became foreign minister in November
L. Broad foreign policy goals have not changed appreciably. He
advocates economic as well as political integration with the West*
He calls for the continued support of MATO and the reunification
of Germany without the use of force, as does his superior, Chan-
cellor Adenauer* But the new foreign minister seems to have a
somewhat different outlook towards eastern Europe and appears to
have assumed more interest in that area* In the fall of 1961 he
organised a new planning staff for the purpose of evaluating West
Germany' 8 foreign policy towards eastern Europe and reformulation
thereof as deemed necessary* To achieve an insight into Dr.
Schroeder' s views of eastern Europe the following statements will
be illuminating
i
Day after day, the propaganda machines of these countries
Q.e* the communist countries of Europe] depict to oople
the nightmare of revenge-seeking Germans* The face is, how-
ever, that we do not follow a policy of revenge or restoration
today, nor shall we do so in the future* Our policy does not
look back into the past but forwards to tomorrow*
Our participation in building up a new Western Europe has
already proved that we are looking beyond pre-war Europe*
Political, economic and technical development has made further
.-ass and it is from this that we must proceed. The period
of national power politics that characterised pre-war Europe
definitely belongs to the past* We aim at a new Europe of
free nations living together as good neighbours* The nations
of the Warsaw Treaty, too, belong to Europe. In my opinion,
it would be a good idea to drop the communist propaganda of
hatred and resento impairs relations between East
^opean countries and Goraany. This could certainly
achieved if the governments of the East bloc did not evade
their duty, old be made, for example, by estab-
lishing better contacts in the fields of culturia life and






human relations between Germans in the Federal Republic and the
peoples of East European countries*
We take a serious interest in the present intellectual dis-
putation that is waging in the East bloc and are convinced that
all open-ainded undogmatic people in Eastern Etirope would profit
from an acquaintance with the cultural and political develop-
ment of Free Europe,6
Four months later he said on the same subject:
As regards the East European States, we neither pursue, nor
will we pursue, a policy of revenue* We do not hate these
people, but have one single aim, and that is to live witn then
in peace as good neighbors. This is certainly possible. Our
policy is directed forwards not backwards. By our cooperation
in creating the new order of Europe we have already shown that
we look beyond pre-war Europe.
9
r. Schroeder, a lawyer and Kinister of the Interior since
1955, may be initiating a new trend in West German foreign policy,
Chancellor Adenauer notwithstanding. Perhaps the aging chancellor
does not exert the same amount of Influence as he did when V est
Germany was newly born. A British reporter noticed that after a
visit by U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to Bonn, Dr. Schroeder
expounded rather freely on foreign policy which represented a new
departure since Chancellor Adenauer normally would do this hits*
self.10
8Germany . Europe and The Free World , a speech made in
Dortmund on June 4, 1962 (Bonn: Buch- and Zeitiingsdruckerei fl.
Kollen, 1962), p. 15. An official translation,
9peace
.
Freedom . Order, a speech at the 10th Federal Con-
ference of -;he CDU/C5IJ Protestant Working Greup at Wiesbaden on
5 October, 1962 (Bonnx Buch- und Zeitungsdruckerie h. Kollen,
1962), p. 16. An official translation,
10
Terence Prittie, "Adenauer and Schroeder," The Uew












Within the larger framework of international relatione be-
tween east and west one can eabark upon a conjectural discussion
aa to whether or not Schroeder'e statements reflect a changing
world situation* Seetinj -side such a discussion, however, it is
readily diecernable that certain events or evolutions on the world
arena are well observed by him. For example, he hopes that the
ideological rift within the communist bloc which has divided mono-
lithic* into polyccntriam will offer more opportunity for closer
contacts between West Germany and the satellite countries, a
factor which could lead to improved inrer-nstion relationships and
help to eradicate the memories of World War II. This schism in the
bloc could also have been the basis for acme reorientation toward
the east. On the other hand the responsiveness of East European
governments is manipulated by the Kremlin despite comparative
Polish autonomy since 1956. Nevertheless, the eastern block with
its economic problems cannot have failed to note the prosperity and
material wellbeing in western Kurope, an area in which West Germany,
the main enemy of World War II, is a key member. This evolution
of European affairs should diminish the acerbity between the two
areas as time progresses.
Hi German foreign policy towards Eastern Europe - called
Ostpolitic in Germany - has been considered by some to be a
:&chtost»x>:Lltik. What criticism and coanent there hae been both
inside and outside of West Germany is of interest, and this sur-
vey now turns to this aspect.
n.*.)
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Unofficial Views and Public -pinion
Regarding unofficial discussion of foeet Germany 1 s role in
entral and Eastern Europe three distinct s^eres can be delin-
eated. First, public opinion and the views of various groupt.
west Germany should be explored; secondly, the arguments raised
by satellite government sj and thirdly, the views expressed by
emigres from Kast Central Europe, representing the population in
that area thr.t cannot speak freely.
West German views . Before examining various groups in
West Germany it is appropriate to ascertain public interest in
foreign affairs. A West German "Institute for Market and
Opinion Research" (abbreviated as in Gerrsan) over a num-
ber of years has conducted surveys among Ws#t Germans. The re-
sults from the question, "tfhat do you personally consider most
important: that we Gerrsans are on good terms with the /ur*ericans,
on good terms with the Russians, - I we stay neutral between
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J Good t Good terms111,1 —
•
' "
. » w_\ eutral !->injLon
6/56 4 54 4
11/56 31 2 62 5
1957 39 2 55 4
10/57 42 3 52 3
5/5B 36 3 53 3
9/53 36 2 60
B/59 a 2 54 3
11
It is a well known fact that failaciee are inherent in
public opinion polls limits the interpretation of t
j some extent. However, ose polled, a
Lderable lveragin* .1 fifty percent, pre-
fers diaassociation frora east and west* Mi doubt a large
number of the neutral sists of individuals th«t are
: >-political or a-political as far as politics are con-
cerned, especially in Germany where obedience to leadership has
been a salient national trait* As further evidence in this area,
the orporation has ued an exhaustive study from which
the following conclusions have been derived:
**&# men , Bielefeld West Germany, trans.
litaer, *est ; ~ roi.se -.. -.\ Defense, Ho . /»l t
German Polls of 1959 on 'Rearmament , Atomic Energy, Nuclear
over, octs of Peace,
"Sant; 1700






1. In the political real* Germans are likely to mention
reunification as Germany*;; »aajor political problem}
2. Popular interest in political life is still not over-
whelming, but appears to be risin
3. There is a fairly si trend toward a I -ty
systeu„12
lsequcntly, the attitudes of HSst Germany towards East
Central Europe cannot be found suae :.ny
great extent. Thus, to determine these .des it will be
necessary to look at the opinio 3 "elite" interest
groups, to use a o ansulgated by a number of writers."^
However, even here re on t as often as not seem
to have disagreementa. Setting aside political party designa-
tions, individuals with reactionary or conservative feeling©
include refugees, industrialist, s looking for amrkste in eastern
Europe, rightwingers, and those who advocate strong German national-
ism and would look to an individual such as Fran* Josef Strauss as
a leader. Often they blame all the victors if ; War II i
Germany's current status and on occasion evidence anti-American
feelings. Their slogan can be smarted up in a quote by a former
ans Speier and W. Phillips Daviec
,
or-
Sid^ and rorelr;i ""'oil Ulnod
*hve example, Charles 0. Lerche, Jr.,
$)M |F v -rl '• - —iS ••• •" •*itionj Englewood" lew Jer« ,
?., 1961), ;. 31 et se&», or Hugh 3ei
•<eitber War gar f aacc (revised edition: Ren ! 1*1 ^r«deric;- -.
Praeger, •
-t ct seq «
.r.Tt,.?ov^elt r/r,
-.' r




What God, geography, and we Germans have created cannot
be rent asunder by fumble liticians.*^
Since they argue that the USSR is the key factor in effect-
German reunification tnis is the nation to do business v
and, additionally, dealings with the satellites might servo only
to antagonise the USSR; this, in turn, could be detrimental in
furthering Germany's national interests, Thoy also argue th
West Germany should possess nuclear weapons and become a strong
deterrent force, thereby increasing their international prestige*
While Adenauer and, no doubt, his succcssr , would oppose
this view, the ex-defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, would
,
they reason. Thus, Germany "would purchase unity from the
1*>
;jians at the expense of the nations in between," ' Such
reasoning must disturb the Russians to a great extent who always
claim fears of a resurgent military Germany and upset those
"nations in between" even more. Referring back to earlier d.
cussion regarding the two historic trends of Ger >reign
policy it is of interest to note the ] I expressed.
Even though the West German government has diplomatic r as
^Terence Pr -vans i









only with the USSR among the bloc n lions, it emphatic lly denies
16
rtaininp any "Rapallo* c 3.
The opinions expressed above on the subject of re©
views are oy no aeans uniform, Variances occv oted,
example, among the business men* They argue that since World War
II there has been altogether too men emphasis on trading with the
west, and this has led to too much dependence on western markets*
Thus, more diversification sho; sought and trade with eastern
rm should be enhanced to regain markets that Germany enjoyed
in this area prior to World war II* Although West Germany has had
no particular problem in finding markets for her goods it is wise
to look toward the future. Moreover, from a political point of view
national assertiveness is impeded by failing to have business deal-
ings witn an area th^t traditionally sought much of its imports in
17
QstasR »
In West Germany there is also a group that is opposed
any relations with the Soviet bloc. This group consists of some
of the Christian Democratic leaders, sons civil servants, the
Roman tholic hierarchy and a sector of public opinion 1 they havs
sens serious misgivings about increasing trade with the Soviet
IBbloc and extending diplomatic relations to its nations.
*we, op., cjt., P. U.5.
^Spei Davison, og. cj^t., pp. 236- , assim .
l^Deutsch and Edinger, oj£. cit,, p. 2. ,
on
•
• : - -
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One group that favors increased contacts with the west is
composed of member* of the social democratic party, nany civil
servante including Poreir sennel, a number of perr.
ac upper social strata and some protestant members of the
ristlSB democrats. They believe that fcest Gerssany should "take
up diplomat! ily beneficial trade relations,
generally' reacquaint the Eastern Europeans with Germany" in order
to "strengthen the satellite states to become more eel: iat»***
aourse, there are shades of opinions in this group as well, on
sueh natters as the final disposition of the Oder-Neisse frontier
or the ctrine. Of interest in particular is the
attitude of Many of the civil servants who consider the Russians
as representative of an Asiatic world, while the Germans consider
themselves as completely western. Peoples such -a ;sechs and
Poles are considered equally as western. Thus, they would not be
20
adverse to compromise on border and refugee problems* Even-
tually all the memberr- by mutual con-
tacts feast Central Europe may through a process of evolution be
swayed toward the west. The sisiilaritv between this reasoning









The expellee and recuses groups In West Germany quite
naturally have predictable views* The v sectci is
p is present In the major political car all
b German politicians must consider in Cu
campaign speeches; consequently , eastern border issues are o&t
alive during election time. Since the advent of the sixties It has
been reported that the organised expellee movements have lost such
of their impetus, and many of their vociferous leadere lack mass
ort. Furthermore, their representation in the Bundestaj/-
dvindled and the expellees and refugees are becoming absorbed
21
more and nore into West German life.
The overall attitude of the Vest German population be-
yond governmental official circles has been described as one
willing to abandon the idea of trying to reclaim the pre-war
German territories in the east as a quid pro quo for closer
relations with its eastern neighbors, in tils ease
this tren nues, an alleviation of a major tension spot
could possibly occur, «UJL Poles, in and outside P advo-
cate retaining the present Qder-h'eisse t or, ee
ce any changes would necessitate more : ion transJ
furthermore, a large portlor. e new MM
born there.
^arah Gainham, "Polanaise,"
no, 6932 (April 3 S2), j ,




raunist writers will expound on crraan rst .arism
because of her ass >n wit? . '. or n
ipoan pr«ss was particularly add when ratific for the
ropean Defense Caaaunity were passed,
the Wee ons» ** When more detailed
be remsmbered thr<t the satellites will, of course, express thea-
selves within a framework which is acceptable to the Kremlin.
As will be seen in a later chapter the satellite lants have
expressed a wish to establish diplomatic relations with West
many. Since has d it is safe to assume
the green light has been given to the satellites wise.
Should the satellites themselves be insincere in these state-
ments, they have no cause for c- -ucern, since the Hellr; -c-
trine is likely < vail.
the case of the coasnunist Poles, the German question
to some appar appears t isicier ition:
relationships wi West Oeraany and i
reunified Germany should this occur, Ian is i
ed as a politic -ry sol
,
.de
is advocated, probably for Le reason




purchase elsewhere those items which the Russians need them-
selves. However, Bonn is considered to be taking advantage of its
ition in NATO to seek a larger role for itself.
The Yugoslav regime is not tied to the Kremlin apro -
strings, but articles published in Yugoslavia express ouch the
sane opinions as do writings in the satellite countries. It
views trade relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe
favorably, urges the recognition of the Gder-fteiese line by the
government sad the abolition of the Hallstein and other doc-
trines.
*
The latent fear of Germans in the countries bordering up-
on Germany is, of course, a convenient tool for the communist
propaganda machine. This fear diminishes in those countries
that are more distant. Another method of capitalising on Wsst
Germany's past history is to exploit the many trials of wartime
Nails in East Central Europe for propaganda purposes, Further-
more, the rise in status of many old ftasis in West Germany adds
^These views are expressed by communist writers in many
articlss such ass Manfred Lachs, "Poland^ kuest for European
Security, 11 frternatlonai Affairs (London), vol. 35» no. 3 (July,
1959), pp. 305-309} Klcmens Keplica, "Poland and the Two Gar-
sanies, ; &£ &*&&&! vol » Af - i0 « WT? (Augm»* 3, 1957)|
137-138} or Jersy Kowslewski, "Two Tendencies in West Germany,"
Polish Perspectives, vol. IV, no. k (April, 1961), pp. 10-13.
25"Good Hews free, Bonn and Toityo," Review of International
Affairs (Beograd), vol. XII, no. 261 (February 20 , 19ol),
pp. 6-7} and fen, "Freezing of the German Problem. n Review










fusl to the fire; one particularly shocking case involved the elec-
tion in 1951 of ex-SS general Heinz fteineforth to the Schleswig-
tiollstein St-te Assembly. This general is known to the Poles as
the "Butcher of Warsaw" for atrocities coraoitted against the under—
26
ground in Warsaw during the uprising in August of 1944*
Views of emigre's from Sast Central Europe , The ekigres from
East Central Europe are generally the only ones who can speak for
the population in this area apart from the governments which, of
course, are only amplifiers of camsunianu As can be expected the
reflections of the population vary geographically depending upon
former relations with or memories of Germany or upon their proximity
to the USSR.
Regarding the question of whether or not West Germany has
had an Qstrolitik. arguments have been given indicating a wide
range of beliefs. Juliuss 1-ti.erossewski, a writer in the Polish
emigre' journal Kultura claims that the Germans have had none since
the end of World War II* According to him, their thinking is just
atinuation of traditional outlooks, which is estimated to be
a collaboration with the Russians at the expense of the Poles in
27between. ' This is quite natural, since all previous German-
Polish collaboration has led to suffering for Poland. Referring
26
T.H. Tetens, The New Germany and the Old Nazis (New York:
Random House, 1961), pp. 61^2, passim.
27Juliusz riieroszewski, "On the Grave of Ostpolitlk,"
Kultura (Paris), no. 12/132 (December, 1962), pp 92-93, passim.







to the two trends discussed in chapter II, examples of Germans and
Russians reaching across Poland are far more numerous than instances
of German-Polish collaboration*
The opposite view is, of course, -sany has had an
active oatoolitiK , but the internstional situation has put Units
upon it. ?o support this view it has been pointed out that Ger-
mans have always been interested in East Central Europe and, no
doubt, will continue to be. At the present this active policy is
expressed two ways) first, through a conti-med survey of the area
and secondly, by commercial relatione. This survey is manifested
by intensive study of the area in private institutions or organisa-
tions, such as tne Institute for Easter oe in Munich. At
present the Germans who were evicted from East Central Europe have
brought with them a thorough knowledge of the area. Lately tour-
ism is increasing with t ese Germans being permitted to revisit
lands they have left. Of course, additionally, many Germans
originally from West Germany travel in East Central Europe as
well* In the economic field there is and has been a number of
traveling West German econorsic commissions in Sac .rope,
eg
and these carry political overtones.
An intermediate view la Jest Germany has both a posi-
tive and a negative Lk. Its positive features consist of a
^"Kr. Constantin Visuiano, 'Washington, D*C. expressed these
opinions to the author in an interview on July 5, d.s inter-





desire for reconciliation with the population in East Central Europe,
notably the Polish people who have suffered the maxim jb of illwill.
/-'urthormore, West German leaders, case of Poland, real.
oland is a permanent fixture a isequ*:-. o dispel
any Polish apprehension of future German designs on the area* How-
ever, any implement- 1ion of the Rap& secure lonal
peacs and order in entr, ape is not considered feasible
the Polish population inasmuch as everyone knows that foreign
sinister Rapaekl Is controlled by Mosoow; therefore, any with-
drawal of troops would mean withdrawal • . troops from Con-
29
tral Europe which would be ominous* On the negative aide the
Qder-Ueisso river border diepute dominates West German Ostpolltlk .
This border that all Poles everywhere consider ?.rraanent, is
not recognised by 'West Germany even t 4denauer has repeatedly
renounced force to effect a settlement sat to Germany.
The Poles wonder just what German intentions may be regarding tills
30frontier regi . It appears that many Poles believe, and many
others share tide belief, that the partition of Germany has resulted
2^1
. ante Chapte , p# 29
30
r. Stefan Korbonski expressed these opinions to the
author in an interview on July 9, 963. This interview will





la West Genaany gaining the trust of the west. This division
a precondition to Franoo-Gerraan rspprocheaent reconciliation
between these two nations has dene much to fur iropean integra-
tion. Any policies leading to the reunification of East and West
Germany should not Jeopardise the trust the West Germans have so far
31
gained* 3 inaction, a declaration by the United States
w in a future peace treaty it would consider the Jder-"teisse
frontier a final border, would do much to alleviate present con-
32
com.
Among the East Central European population there are signs
that the attitude toward the German people is beginning to change.
In 1956 a magazine article** in a Roman Catholic newspaper
Poland described the spirit o£ atonement that had gripped the
present-day German. Considering the milieu in which this article
was written, It is somewhat surprising that suoa a view ever was
writor jaaintslned that militarism and military
31;SieroBaewskl, oj>« cit .. p. 94.
32julj eroszewaki, "liberation, Containment 1 Co
Jtura (Parts), no. 7 , 1962 as adapted under the
title, "Eaate ape* A Bridge between United States and
Soviet Union," Central Kuropean Federalist t vol, 1, no.
(December, 1962}, p. 12.
ritten by Leopold T^vmnd in ryj;odnik Powaaceciiny. as
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tradition had been replaced by the concern over material well-
being in the minds of the West Gorman population. The author was
ridiouled in the official and eeBii-offi: >li»li proee for even
voicing auch thoughts*
If one examines the attitude of a n tion that geographically
is one of the furtherst renoved from West Germany, similar thoughts
are evident. Referring in this instance to Rumania, the popula-
tion of this nation has always had a penchant for France and what
it stands for. Admittedly there was an alliance during World War
XI with Nasi Germany, but popular support was weak. At present
the Rumanian population, in the shadow of Russia and remembering
the recent loss of Bessarabia, has begun to look to West Germany
as a possible future barrier to Soviet encroachments. The economic
growth of West Germany, its integration with Western Europe and the
recent Franco-German Treaty of Reconciliation have materially con-
v 34
tributed to this outlook.
Locking at the Csech population a more cautious view is
prevalent. There is more of a "wait and see" attitude. Of
course, being closer to West Germany and having bad memories
from the German occupation, the attitude of the people at large
is bound to be colored accordingly. But the three factors t





35Dr. Joaef Lettr: reesed these opinions to the author
in an interview on July 9» 1963. This interview will hereinafter












In general, the opinion has been expressed that West Ger-
many should make an effort to seek allies in eastern Europe. So
far oosMunist propaganda has made no distinction between the Third
36
Reich and the Bundearepublik .
Regarding any prospective cringes in West Gertian foreign
policy several eaigre^ leaders seera to believe that with Schroeder
as foreign sinister a *rd ae lellor would be a con-
tinued economic outlook toward eastern Kurope with lacreas
37
stress on economic considerations. course it is rather con-
jectural to attempt to evaluate accurately the future course of a
nation.
In the post-war European boom the West German population
has been primarily absorbed in reconstruction and developing an
affluence. . Mm ical scene only certain groups are 1
tereeted in foreign affairs and these set forth various opinions.
West German foreign policy toward the east has centered pri-
marily around the reunification ar;i frontier issue with hopes of
reconciliation with the various psoples of East Central Europe
^"Walter > " K«w Germany and Eastern Europe,"
Ukrainian Quarterly , vol. 17 (Winter, 1961), p. 308.
37for example, -miano and Dr, Lettrich.




as a desired addition. The political opposition favors increased
contacts oetween the two areas inclu omatic relations,
s satellite governments are seeking, or so they say, diplomatic
relations with west Gerraany, re, a cr.militarised and
denuclearised Geraany would serve tl.eir purpose a. A&ong tho non-
eaaraunist tions there is a growing realization of what has
happened and is happening in Viestern Europe where a new Oenaan
nation is - closely
integrated orr/irenment of which they would like to be a part, and






WEST GERMAN RKLATIONS WITH EAST CKNTRAL
-.'.
.:, J >49-1955
In 1%9 the three western sonea of Germany were fused and
a German government with a new constitution was established in
boi -itary government ended in Sejjtomber 1949 when allied
control was exercised through a civilian High Commission on
which each of the three western allies were represented. This
Commission was charged, in the nana of the allies, with a mas-
ter of functions, one being the management of foreign affairs of
the new nation.
iships
As early as November 1949 in the first allied-Canaan agree-
ment negotiated by this Commission, the so called Petersberg Pro-
tocol, the new West German state entered the field of foreign
affairs. This agreement, the most important provisions of which
halted further dismantling of German industry, allowed West Ger-
many to -ttrticipate "in all these international organisations
through which German experience and support can contribute to the
general welfare* and to "initiate the gradual re-establishment of
consular and commercial relations with those countries where such
relations appear advantageous." Adenauer's temperament, as
wrtmeaH LsmanU . Germany Modified}
Text of Protocol of Agreements, "Departstent of State liulletin. vol.







described earlier , revealed itself front the beginnings hie autobi-
ography ehows that Adenauer was at time* quite adawant and anxious to
have his way in wording the eommuiilqus'.
Kegarding implement tion of the Petereberg Protocol West Ger-
any began by establishing its contacts with the free world as
would be expected. In eastern Europe Stalin ruled a monolithic
empire from which Yugoslavia was excluded in 1943* No political
contacts between Stalin's empire and the West German government
existed and this situation was to continue with hardly any change
up until 1955 when West Germany became a full sovereign state, and
1956, when the Polish and Hungarian uprisings occurred, which in-
fluenced the outlook of the West German government.
However, Yugoslavia presented a different situation. Im-
mediately following World War II Tito's stock was high in loscow,
and Belgrade was chosen as ths seat for the new Cominform. How-
ever* after failing to bow to the Kremlin, Tito and the Yugoslav
Communist Party were expelled from the communist family in June of
1948* Western aid helped Tito to sustain his nation until after ths
death of Stalin when diplomatic relations were renewed between
Yugoslavia and the USSR and its satellites. During the early fifties
West Germany and Yugoslavia initiated a rapprossheroent which led to an
2Paul Weymar, Adenauer. His Authorised Biography, trans.











exchange of ambassadors. West Germany's economy at that tire was
beginning to feel the fruit* of the European Reeovery Program,
something the Yugoslavs did not fail to note* As early as 1'
a West German trade mission was established in Jugoslavia,
trade mission also contained a consular section. Furthermore, the
Germans nominated an economic expert as ambassador, and ambassadors
3
were exchanged around the t«ew Year, 1952* The Yugoslavs, oa their
part, expressed their wish to establish contacts with kes' an
4
xal Democratic leaders and trade union officials as wei <
Popular hacking did not appear to support the ties with Yugoslavia,
? exaraole, a few years later such a flood of protest letters
descended upon the Bavarian Stat* Radio prior to a broadcast of a
taped speech by the president of the Yugoslav parliament that a
r
last minute cancellation resulted,
Bconomie ftelffitionshlns
nough political relations between West Germany and the
-' r. Joerg Kastl, First Secretary, German bjabassy, WashuL-p-
ton . in an interview at the Embassy on July 15, 1963, herein-
after cited as the July
*M.S. Handler, "Yugoslavs Foster West German Ties,' ew
Yorft Times. November 17, 1952, p. 11.
5The Hew York 'fines






satellite governments were oat of the question, the economic aspects
belonged to a oomnletely different sphere* As has been pointed out
previously lack of diplomatic relations does not preclude economic
transactions, arid German eeonoedc interests nave been longstanding
iast Central Europe*
In 1947 a Joint Export and Import Agency (JRIA) was created
to supervise German foreign trade under the occupation; this a ency
lasted until 1955* ikfwever, there vers a number of countries with
which there ware no JEIA agreements, and in December, 195? > the so
called o^aussfhusj der Peu^echto Wirtsqhaffr it he. Eastern Committee
of Canaan Economy) was crested at the suggestion of the federal
governaent* This Eastern Comittee filled in those areas lacking
these JEXA agreements* This committee still exists and is of great
importance to west Genua:!-? nst European trade* It is supported by
five organizations J the Federation of Gerr-an industries
ieeyerbanvi der Deutsche*} Industrie ), the Association of Ger-
man Chambers of C l—
'
II (Ifrifrsoher ^nfostrie- und Handels^a
Central Association of German Banks and Bankers (£cntral-
verband dec Banken- und tJankjerKewerbos ) * the I nX associa-
tion of German Vfooleeale and Foreign Trade ( Oesar.itvorband dee
Peutsc ^£>- Ust Aussenhandsls ) and the Import Association
-'
* Upon its creation this Eastern Consaittee was
°Wenaol Jaksch, Germany and East' iition
u Lo-Poruaf 1962), p. 23.








designated by th« Federal Ministry of Eeonond.es aa the only organisation
in West Gemany competent to deal with the problem of inproving trade
relations with Easter e, excluding East Germany and Yugoslavia,
course, the allied High Cosmissioners • approval was needed and
this was secured, the functions of the Eastern Committee have been
described as fallows:
1. To advise the Federal Cfcvernmest I:nd German econonic
organizations on trade with the East.
2, To centralize requests from (hm cerns that rvay
desire trade with eastern European countries and to assist
their representatives to conclude agreements,
, Pena. is est;- relations wi\
th loc, to send unof: delegations to those coun-
tries for the purpose of negotiating trade and Daymen
agreements with the approv Feder y&
the Allied High Contdssion.
4. To work out delivery and payment conditions and the
legal aspects of agr
5. To prepare documentation on the economic development of
/let bloc countries and to keep C* lomic . a-
tions posted on new commercial possibilities and is iru
Eastern jCurope that have changed radically since liorld War II,'
The Eastern Committee, although a private organisation,
could not help out gain an aura of semi-officialdom since it was
sanctioned by the Kinistr c. has ^rown in impor-
tance and has become a pressure groap exerting its influence upon
. iiandler, S!8onn Unit to Seek Soviet Bloc Trade,"
:'eu
-2i£jL member 19, 1952, ..
afar
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the federal government in general and Chancellor Adenauer in par-
ticular.
Hie Polish, Hungarian, Csechoslovakian and Rumanian gove
wonts, in turn
,
permanent trade representatives in Fr<i
furt am Main ever since In fact, be
Bonn government, they were located in Berlin. These na-
tives also handle i ~e satelli is
which are not represented in West Germat On the ads
tive side there have bee ..taints ever since r that cum-
bersome visa procedures del r-jerce in
mec -*ded t try are delayed
their travels; likewise, trave .:, Germany by Eas" \s
is equally cumbersome -el permits are o-
In the area of trade agreements one of the first reportod
instances took place in April of 195? wi •sslavia. Since
diplomatic relations were in oxis anted no problem.
.* agreement was centered around the Yugoslav zone of Trieste
which in the past received consular soods from Ital r-
ter arrangements and in conjunction with Austria West Germany
%astl view of July 15, 1963.
'Jakaeh, loc. eit .
-.
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furnished machinery .Is, etc.,
10
exchange for bauxite, marble iural ts,
>rt tern c. were granted to Yugoslavia, but by 1954 its
government attempted to gain ic. from Wss'.
iy«
Xn the early siaaaer of 1952, lans Kroll, the heed of the
est Trade Departs
nounced that trade c Lth try
Itad bee:, c ed. These were rx>dest agreements. To give s
ication sf . c scope of trade, ,s from Poland, the lar-
gest e ic three, amounted In this
case as with other -13-ies, t-rade enbar
strategic materials In the I east-west trc be con-
12
sidered. mm agree. well -
East Central Euro-pear., waents wore short ter
ear in d-.L , occurred, a ;is
for a few months. Agreements for as long as zXon. of £
teen months have been signed, as for exanplo v, Igaric.
lc
.
_( London), April 3 2, p, 3,
^J rade Link," Tho
HffiS tares, rt'oveaber 13,, p* 6,




August of 1952.*3 For the sake of continuity and ease of evalua-
tion, import and export statistics will be discussed in the follow-
ing chapter. However, it should be emphasised that the amounts
involved were modest, but always increasing from year to year*
. .iaparison trade nil was late in startii;
It was practically non-existent up until 19!>4. I I West Genmn
Leonomics .> sinister stv ce during this period that bilateral
trade discussions with the Soviet union were out of the question.
If talks were to be held, they would have tc be gh
the baited iatlons 1 £conomic Uonsnission xr* on which all
jpean nations that are UN members are r< ted, I
in addition West Germany and Switzerland.
Suranary
The relations between West Geraany and East Central Europe
during the first half of the fifties exist f in the economic
sphere, with the exception of Yugoslavia with which diplomat
relations were established as the international scene made this a
realistic venture.
important foundation for trade r-
was c_- in the so call- r. ;Ltt'- re-
3 Federal iiepul e as far as trade was
York U-acs, iM . .







concerned, although it was a private organisation*
Outside of this sphere propaganda exchanges and slrollar
recriminatory outbursta characterised this period* The satel-
lites* of course, have continued their propaganda barrage to date,
but with fluctuations in conformance with Kremlin policy* As
rest Germany entered the second half of the fifties there were
changes In Eastern Europe and sane increased contacts as the




WEST OBRMUl RELATIONS -L EUROPE,
1955-1961
The year 1955 was a turning point for West Germany. In
May of that year trie nation gained the status of a full soverei
oeeatne a member of NATO and was authorised to create military forces
of her own within the limitations imposed by the Paris Accords by
way of the Western European Union, The Soviet Union with ite Euro-
pean satellites created the Warsaw Pact as a counterraeasure. As
early as 1952 vest Germany joined the Benelux countries, France and
Italy in the European Coal and Steel Community, the first suprana-
tional organisation in Western Europe. Later, in 1953 these tana
nations formed the European Economic Community - or as it is more
commonly known, the Common Market - and the European Atomic Energy
Community - or BURATOM. As previous discussion has shown, West
Germany has always been primarily Western or European oriented in
its foreign policy, and the implementation of this western outlook
can be aeon in West German participation in these activities.
May im - ^9to^r 1??6
In the year 1955 the Soviet Union &iso conceded that West
Germany was a soverign state and exchanged aii&assadora with her*
Thia occurred in September 1955 in the "Geneva Spirit" as the period
Immediately following the July summit meeting has been character-


















uaccepted do jure the existence of two Geraanies.
Political aspects . As the Sovet Union officiaily recog-
nised Meet Germany, the satellite governments apparently were
allowed to sake similar arrangements should the opportunity arise.
In September of 1955 the communist newspaper Scanteia of Rumania
stated that the Rumanian government sought diplomatic relations
with West Germany** la January 1991 the first meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Past took place in
Prague • References to West Germany occur in the declaration issued
at the end of the meeting. This particular declaration stresses
peace and friendship with mention of the Geneva summit meeting
the previous summer, but with no reference to the unsuccessful
foreign ministers* meeting the previous autumn* In the text of
the declaration it was stated, inter alia, that "the establishment
of good neighborly relatione between ••• Csechoslovakia and Fed-
era! Germany would be of great significance," Additionally, non-
aggression pacts would contribute beneficially between nations to
3improve relations, A few weeks earlier a Csech official had stated
that the Czech government recognised the German Federal republic
and its goverraient, and it sought diplomatic relations and good
neighborly relations with it. Five months after the Warsaw Pact
Hhe Hew York Times. September 16, 1955, p. 12.
2M H2SL *2£k At—. January 29, 1956, p, 1*3,








meeting the C&echs and the Hungarians on the same day issued further
statements, the former for a non-aggression pact and the latter for
diplomatic relations. In these eases as in all others the above
5
described Hallstein Doctrine was invoked by West Geraany. But
no political adjustment originating from West Germany occurred
during this time period.
A different situation developed in Yugoslavia, At this
point it should be noted, however, that a ra ' ehessict between
Tito and the Kremlin leaders began to affect Yugoslav-West Cter-
man relations. In the busy month of 24ay, 1955 » Khrushchev and
Bulganin visited Tito on a trip that reseembled a Canossa Jour-
ney. Tito again became respectable in the communist cracunity
and relations continued to improve culminating in what is best
described as a "smiling" visit by Tito to Moscow one year later.
In his relations with West Germany Tito was quite adamant on
settling claims against Germany which had accrued from the Nazi
occupation during World War II. fa July 1955, the West German
government declared that it was ready to commence negotiations
on this subject. In a speech on July 28 Tito stated that the
claim amounted to a minimum of ?10O million and that he was not
7
going to back down fron this sua.' sequently, the West German
%ne Times (London), August 2, 1956, p f 6.
6
Ibld.. July 14, 1955.
7Ibid .. July 28, 1955.
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mgoverwaent received a note seeking payment of this amount* tkm
Apparent reason for Tito* a adopting thia belligerent attitude rSter
several years of friendly relatione, has been attributed to German
delaying tactics, a vacant neat German ambassadorship in Belgrade
since the proceeding December and a recently negotiated compensa-
tion treaty amounting to two and a half million dollars between
Yugo8lavia and Eaat Germany* Naturally the Weat German govern-
ment would find thia latter agreement particularly objectionable.
To add fuel to the fire, in March 1954* the Soviet Union pro-
claimed that its relatione with Sast Germany would be the aame aa
with any aoverelgn state, and it granted by treaty full aoverei
status to East Germany in September 1955* > a
aettlemeat was readied regarding German war clai a: a ©ad; pay-
ment of »14*5 million and about 3 million cash credit for pur-
chaae of Weat German goods. In addition Yugoslavia was granted
until 1968 to repay aome postwar commercial debts at a rate of 3%,
a reduction from 7%,
-hnlcal cooperation . If it ia advantageous for com:: *
nist governments to cooperate with non-cemmunist governments to
further their interests, ideological considerations do not stand
8
Ibid .. August 13, 1955.
9Jack Kaymond, "Yugoslavia Irked by Bonn's Delay," The Hew
York Times . August 13, 1955, p. 2.












In the way* An example of this is evident in the Danube Hirer
Commission. This river has had a colorful history in international
affairs, including the poat-*ar period. After Stalin' a death the
Danubian nations were permitted more control of the maritime affairs
of the river. Included to seme extent in the Danubian nations is
now West Germany. In July of 1955 a west German delegation signed
a bilateral shipping agreement with Rumania wherein West German
shipping was granted access to Danubian setts in Rumania and vice
versa.1* Additionally, since June, 1957, representatives from
West Germany and Austria, as well, have attended the sessions of
the Danube River Gotmaission as experts. As a side issue it is of
interest to note that the Common arket is also represented at
12
these meetings* sf at present, the Danube Coramisalon is an
international technical organisation includin east and west
represent. A further bilateral attempt for :autuai accomoda-
tion in river traffic occurred in July of 1956 when West Germany
and Czechoslovakia desired to regulate traffic on the Klbe.^
:iomic agreement a . Kconoade agreements continued to
be concluded with East Central Europe with quite a sharp rise in
^he Times (London), July 4, 1955.
^raeainski, 0£. cit .. p. 452
^The Times (London, fourth edition), July 27, 1956, p. 10.
wo *d
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scope, notably with Poland and Czechoslovakia. The yearly trade
agreement with Czechoslovakia happened noet like! ;nance, to
be concluded almost simultaneously id s just-mentioned Vareaw
Paot meeting. Consequently, the Czech announcement of the c>
cluaion of thi» agreement was intertwined with good will pro-
nouncements, such as "the exchange of .roods between various coun-
tries leads not only to a continuous increasing of volume of trade
but also to the creati more friendly relations between na-
Besides trade agreements payments agreements were also
drawn up. Due te convex1 Llity difficulties arrangements were
generally made by liar clearing, but dating from 1955
a satellite government would have in West Germany a non-interest
bearing German mark account to which the Germans would make pay-
ments for imports from a satellite government 'while the latter in
turn could use this account to pay for purchases in West Germany,
Corresponding arrangements were made in the satellite nations for
the west Germans. This development was a result of increased
convertioillv it about by 1
*opean Payments Union of the Organization for European
15
-operation* ' the international orgardsation which dispensed
Marshall aid in Europe.
Sidney Gruson, "Prague and 3onn Will Widen Trade, "The
New York Times . January 31, 1956, p. 3.
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Red Crcaa agreements . In the field of human bona oer-
i accorapliehments were achieved during this period. orced
expulaiona resulting from the impleme n of the Potsdam Pro-
tocol came to an • l951. In 1950 and 1951 the Intornational
Red Croas arranged for some 45*000 Germans to leave Poland and
X to Lm ia. In 1952 at a meeting in Toronto
the International Red Cross had passed a resolution calling upon
societies to facil Tamily reunions of
3e individuals separated as a result -Id War II, In
the president of the West German Red Cross societ.
nance inister Weitx, had addressed a number of letters t
opposite number. >scow, Prague, Budapest, Varsav a*
real without result; . 1955 the Poles, for exany-le, had
unilaterally allowed 627 German nationals to return, althc
there were Many raore Who wished to leav . a group in-
ded skilled worker
,
Polish government was not dous
to let them leave, and some attempts to satisfy their wishes had
been undertaken notably by letting them apeak German and jer-
fitting their childrer ,m in school.
In early December Dr. Weitz and two assistants appeared in
Warsaw and last with the Vice-President of the Polish Red Cross,
Dr. Kelles-Kreuz. They agreed orally th monthly some 800 to 1000
Walter Sullivan, "German's Return Begun by Poland,w The
i








Germans would be allowed to leave Poland during 1956 and 19f
Some discussion took place over the definition of ae arated
family members, but the two parties agreed crated
spouees and parents whose support was needed for tbelr child,
would sake up the bulk of the German nationals to lowed
to leave Poland. the same ate ;od
for customs-free oackages to be sei -3 in Po-
land. However, he was unsuccessful in att< - secure am-
nesty for prisoners who had served over ten years of their sen-
tences. ' In return Dr. V/eits promised to attest- 1 to gain simi-
lar concessions for Polish ils in We
In January 1956, as agreed upon, German nationals began
to arrive in somewhat larger numb** cted. In c
traat to the adeery that the expclles experienced in the late
forties, these migrations I orderly usehold effects
1
1
would follow in sealed £r< le of , ie
President of the PoliaJi Red Cross, r. DomaiMka, and the Secret
General of this organ!cation, iewaki, paid a return visit
om." At the time of the expiration of the agreement
December of 1957 some 60,GO uis had left Poland. It has been
*7Mftotkreu3-Verhandlunge arachan," Deutsches Rotes
KreuB, Heft 1 (January >. 10.
ullivan, ^oc. cit.
^"Polnische Kotkreuz - Delegation in Bonn,'* Deutgenes
Hotes Krouz
,






reported that another 50,000 were anxious to leave, but the
exodus of Germane einee then has been curtailed, although the
Polish authorities have unilaterally permitted some Germans to
21
leave after the expiration of the agreement*
In 1956 Or. Weits successfully c 3d an oral agree-
ment with the Cseeh Red Cross society. In this agreement the
Czechs allowed up to 160,000 German nationals to leave Czecho-
slovakia. As can be expected most of these people vers Sudeten
Germans. In fact, during the proceeding years the Czechs had
been quite liberal in allowing Germane on both sides of the bor-
der to cross over for family reunione. Dr. Beits and his
colleague also agreed upon exchanging a certain number of prison-
ers.^ Since the standard of livin/r is somewhat higher in
Czechoslovakia only 50,000 of the 160,000 were expected to leave
at the time of the negotiations.
From August to October 1956, similar negotiations took
place in Bucharest which resulted in an agreement to allow mem-
bers of families to unite in Germany.2' As will be noted later
^Sidney Gruson, "Most Germans Quitting Poland, Disillu-
sioned by Red Pledges," The JJgw York Times. December 4, 1?57, p. 30,
^Kasti Interview of July jy>, 1963 .
^The New Xork Times, August U, 1956, p. 1, and The Times
(London), August 14, 1956, p. 7.
23





the execution of thie agreement has not been too successful.
Seas of these agreements were, as shown, fairly successful,
especially in the ease of Poland. It should be noted that these
agreements were between private organizations, which eliminated
political difficulties. Nevertheless, Herr Beits as Finance Min-
ister, lent an aura of officialdom to his missions whilo on the
satellite side, all organizations in a communist country cone under
the party's all-inclusive umbrella. At any rate, the Eed Cross soci-
eties served as a convenient and non-official channel of communication.
.tobcr 1956 - October 1957
ithin one short year West Germany wont through a cycle of a
positive outlook toward East Central Europe to a negative reaction
in the political sphere. In October and November of 1956 Poland
gained a measure of autonomy from the installation of the Gomujfe*
regime, and Hungary suffered the results of an unsuccessful up-
rising. These events had a measure of influence in Germany. The
German public's reaction can be seen from the earlier introduced
public opinion poll2** where it was shewn that in the period from
June 1956 to November 1956 the percentage for good terms with the
United States decreased from 3# to 31 and the percentage for West
German neutrality increased from 54 to 62. As expected the percent-
age voting for good terms with the USSR also decreased from 4 to 2.









yhe H nijMlir 2L cloq**' ties with thg East . The German govern-
ment took due note of these events. Thoughts of closer relations es-
pecially with the new Polish government were prevalent. As early as
October 1956 von Brentano said that "a growth of parliamentary forme
and democratic procedures in Poland could pave the way for a new and
25
mutually advantageous relationship between Bonn and Warsaw*" Some
six weeks later von Brentano expressed his hopes that negotiations
with Poland could be undertaken "in a European spirit" including
"provisional" arrangement on the Oder-Neisse frontier, and the
gradual evolution of satisfactory cultural, economic and perhaps
a
in time, political relationships* At the end of the year von
Brentano said he was ready to offer sacrifices to Poland in exchange
27
for reunification without elaborating on the nature of the saeri-
ficee and Poland's contribution to the reunification of Germany. The
Social Democrats in the Bundestag reminded von Brentano that the Poles
were anxious to improve relationships with Germany and the latter stated
that the border issue "need not cause a head-on clash in Polish-German
se
However, no concrete action ever resulted and the year
of 1957 produced only further statements. The West German Foreign
25
'Arthur J. Olsen, "East German Moves Seen," The New York
October 26, 1956, p. 11*
^Arthur J. Olsen, "Bonn Hints Talks on Polish Border," T££
i22E *—ft Times. December 15, 1956, p* 1*
2&& Ti*— (London), December 26, 1956, p. 5*
^Arthur J. Olsen, "Bonn Tie Called Goal of Poland," £he
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Office thought In terms of improved economic relations and perhaps
diplomatic relatione with the odsr-tteisee question "reserved in
special deciHStnts*"2? This latter thought was one that ;-ainod
favor especially among the Social Democrats, itowever, the Poles
tied in the problem of the Qder-rkjisse line as a condition for
diplomatic relations] of course, the West German government never
has been prepared as yet to go this far, although during this period
there was much serious thinking that perhaps the Hallstein Doctrine
could be circumvented by putting Poland in the seme category as the
Soviet Union. Thus, since Poland administered certain pro-war Ger-
man territories she could qualify as an occupation power* The
Poles, on the other hand, did not look favorably on tids proposition,
since they wanted ki out-right German recognition of the Oder-Weisse
30
frontier*
ftH"" fllMTlltir^TttU The uprising in ftaigary in October
and November, 1956, created a steady stream of refugees* Some
4,000 German nationals left Hungary for Austria and some 300 for
Jugoslavia* In May, 1957, the German and Hungarian Red Cross
31
societies concluded an agreement to allow family reunions.
This was the last of the above-mentioned letters to receive an
answer; it should be noted in passing that some agreement notably
. iandler, "Bonn Considering Ties with Poland," The
New Xork Tines. January 19, 1957, p. .
3°Freund, ojp^ cit *. p. 197.
31Hubatsch, op. cit
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on the release of prisoners of war had boon concluded with the USSR
at the time of the •stablistoent of diplomatic relations. To com-
plete this issue, German nationals all along had been allowed to
32
leave Yugoslavia and totaled 60,325 by the end of I960.
In the spring following the Hungarian uprising, it was
reported that the West Germans sent some 5,000 tons of barley and
oata seed valued at one million, dollars to Hungary. The sale was
to the international Red Cross while a four man team from
the Pood and Agriculture Organization of the United BatlenS supcr-
33
vised the distribution of this grain among the farmers*
West German-YufiosJ^v ro}a^ons> This time period, October
1956 to October 1957, started out auspiciously with a mors posi-
tive outlook toward East Central Europe. However, west German-
>slav relations deteriorated sharply resulting in an altered
West German viewpoint.
In February of 1956 Khrushchev delivered his now famous
"de-stalinisation" speech which of course met with great ap-
proval, since ilto , s independent "road to socialism" now was
ideologically correct according to Moscow. In the Hungarian
uprising Tito supported Soviet action, but although Tito moved
32Ibid.
33xhe Times (London), February 9, 1957, p« 5»
It
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closer to the socialist camp, relations aetween hist and Khrushchev
,u«re not always too cordial. However, in the fall to
decided to grant diplomatic re ion to East Germany* At this
av dictator was more sure of his support he
•. e was recognised as the head of his own country by
-ushchev and had received credits from the USSR amounting to
million, es welcome in a nation which has a chroni-
cally Bttfavorable i.~ade balance. Furthermore, as a leader of the
so called neutrals he advocated abolition of military blocs,
"non-axigraaent 1', "active coexistence" and echoed, in general,
-si.
the Soviet forei It lias also been pointed
that it is believed that he feared German reunification,
and thus took t! Is step as a precaution, the Hallstein Doctrine
35
notv
the face of the announced recognition of East Ger-
many by Yugoslavia the West German government was faced with in-
voking the Halletein Doctrine and severing diplomatic relations
or at least imposing some sort of punisliment upon Tito as a warn-
ing to others who r • itertain similar ideas. Economic sanc-
tions were contemplated, such as vdthholding restitution payments
on the World W«r II war claims settlement. In the end Adenauer
Editorial in J£he *££ laps. October 16, 1957, p. 34.
35F. Yorick lilumenfeld, "Yugoslav Nationalism. Lorial





ww centant to sever diplomatic relations* Of course, it would
be of interest to know to what degree West Germany's allies were
suited or involved in this issue*
West Germany broke relations on October 19, 1957 • The West
Geraan ambassador in Yugoslavia. Kurt Georg Pfleiderer, was a most
vociferous opponent to the Hallstein Doctrine, but he died shortly
before these events took place, and the views of Secretary of State
Hallstein and his director of the Legal and Political Division of
37
the Foreign Office, Grewe, prevailed. Some West German-Polish
33
relations reportedly underway at this tine were cut off, and
the Polish newspaper Tribune Ludu harshly criticized the West Ger-
man act saying that this would certainly rule out any hope for
39diplomatic negotiations.
This Yugoslav act did affect West German thinking and
acted, in a way, as a cold shower. The Poles complained, no
doubt justifiably, because it appears that Bonn decided tk
diplomatic relations with fickle eoaasuniet governments was a
risky business, although relations remained unbroken with the
l.S. Handier, "Bonn Discusses Tito with Allies, The,
New York Times . October 17, 1922, p. 22.
37Freund, o£. cit .. p* 198*
38loi<3.. p. 197.
39m .3. Handler, "Bonn Severs Ties with Yugoslavia," The











.. The political statement© by West German officials regard-
»eraan policies with East Central Europe dwindled and as will
un below, the West Oerae... had to start more or
less anew in bu: to Eat »•
tag it met be empha-
sized that the door was not complete. .ied between ;.cat Cer-
oany and embassies in ti Ml were
closed down, 1. a West German con-
sulate is still funeti .rteb. Trade onahips were
affected, the scope
In fact, I Llowing s ?arly agreement was c
eluded with th© that tiiis did not have any
bearing on politica. -tera*
interests in Yugoslavia, and Swede slavia's in West 'ler-
many. Nevertheless, there is a 'vest Gernw Secre
;iba8sy in Belgrade an i.^osiav First
the F .-abase
Movscfeer l?f>7 - October l?6l
Following the ssTerance of d5 ic relations between
West Germany and Yugoslavia a period of inactivity ensued
4QTho New York Times. May 8, 1956%





followed by * moderately increasing interest in eastern affairs*
The year . At the beginning of the year 1953 the West
Gensan foreign office underwent extensive reorganisation, but
.nister von Brentano did not emphasise eastern affaire
JO
in this reshuffling, .najor statements were published re-
the satellite nations; however, Vvest German and
Slav Ambassadors in Hone net in October in order to try to repair
the damaged relations between the two nations. The Yugoslavs
took the initiative in starting these secret negotiations, but
they broke down after six months. The Yugoslavs insisted on main-
taining ties with East Germany. igh the West Germans did not
iet on a direct break between the two, they wanted the Yugo-
slavs to reduce contacts to a minimum. The Yugoslav Forei
inister, Kar considered this "irreconcilable >.-. ?xi-
dsnee ef our foreign poliCQ ." ^ Since that fciat IAMI QmMftJ
and Yugoslavia have attempted to reach agreement in secret nego-
tiations held froir », but so far wit ,out success.
t-cV. .
_ [,_^:. 9lflDIJ& j Iffva, Ma - _^,
1W> *2& £ts effect UDon >&& fonaany's East, _, |g
As stated previously the Forei,; ..stars of the cl States,
^Thc Times (London), February 1, .5.
^Sidney Grusc: ..grade Halts Talks with Bonn,"
New York Times. March 17, 1959, * 11.




Great Britain, France- let Union wet without success
•r 1955 * afters; neva sum-nit raeet-
is a resi. fcht
on*s intrant e over the Gernv onerai
and Berlin ir- ..thin this Xramework West Germany
I question w. es of a solution ieac
ion and the possibility of concluding non-aggression pacts
with her closest t ,e neighbors It should ue recalled th
at this conference, ti n delegates, .ister von
Bre ind Ambassad^ <e, sat around t
the Bast German
fore the bsmH erieva, West y participated in
discussions :<ere a strategy was developed with the
,ain b -he
»ee. iiscussion centero nd the issue of
how to effect a re-niiication . •any. As a side issue, the
eraan
i
'ant wi oellor was
ared to offer non-aggres I all the satellite
mots except , proffered reportedly a.
rep],
-/«s





Relations .raent,s on Germany . 1%4-1
^Sydney Gruson, "Ronn Plans Pacts Poles
and Czschs,




German attitude changed. As exacted, refuge* groups placed -
47
arable pressure on the government to abstain from such a move,
and some believe t. I soded in thwart in,- the in-
stitution of these pacts. :rets proposals
ensued and Adenauer stated publicly that the tine just was a
i for such steps, while the German delegates in Geneva ex-
pressed themselves more diplomatically by saying th / agreed
50
sb pacts.
It appearo, however, .e onset of the Geneva c
ference Adenauer hoped for better relationships with East Central
• conference been, successful these nonaegression
pacts may well have been drawn up, ver, this was n case
and, additionally, the refugee red their go .
-1 twentieth annlvers* t tr II.
September 1, 1959, was the twentieth anniversary of the outbreak
of Merl .aai Germany attacked ace
occasion was expected from West gr, si d
be an opportune moment to achieve be the Poles.










5%te haw fork Tiaae. July 23, 1959, p. 4.
51Mstiilbom Pacts," The Jsconoalst. vol. 192 (August 8,







aver, this date was proceeded by inc "*e developments, the
breakdown of erence b< :e example. One week
uier the 'Wee* .rted on the discissions Mm
the . member to
be se
urnmer.-:
our of the nine do ->o
ns, it
52
Lde a broa* , 3one of ore
salient exse is follot/o:
.'.
as a result of the invasion by the troops of Hitler's Ger-
many and o
war, I mean the Polish nation. For more than a century
.
suffered from the political and warlike conflicts in aut-
iee wai < torn asunder partitioned
j
and twenty years ago they were the first victims of the second
•Id war rid the Soviet Union invaded
country and cruelly destroyed it I say with com-
the 111
one day be a good neighbor to Poland ....
./ears, is Chance P the
Federal Republic of Germany repeatedly stated - and 1 re-
oday - to
es and sympathy between the Germany of today
•arts z
uine friendship may some day develop.
In his speech Adenauer made due reference to *aai Germany




Germany and Poland," Mews From the German Embassy , vol. 3, no.
11 (September 2, 195'/).
.
•3
and the USSR as t;ie main contributors to Polish suffering, Adenauer
had Insisted on Tasking this point and on stressing the partitions
Land.^ The German press commented on this speech by poirrt-
t that one speech could not effect a en
55
nd had 'oeen neglected for such • lor »
The Polish government was not in a n , It is
be obvi this type of speech could underline the se
% coBBSunist it next likely, the Kremlin -was n
ined to look with favor on this speech, since the breakdown of
the foreign adnist ?ew weeks earlier,
teraber 1, 1?59, th Lah Prisa© Minister Jozef
ankiewicz £ave a speech, in a way replying to Adenauer's.
He stressed German remilitarisation and imperialisra, purposely
de»e>netx*ated to President Eisenhower after his very recent visit
est Germany and to rChrushchev because of his impendinfr visit
the United States. He also delivered this brcadsidet
Adenauer, who trie aralyse a" ce ini1 ;s, is
still living. On the twentieth anniversary of the Hitler
attack he shed a few crocodile te rive a
wed<:e between Poland an oviet Union.
d Warsaw. i^, vol. IhX, no. 13
(September 2 .4,
German Eabas „ . contains press reactions
to Adenauer's t 31, 1959 broadcast.
56
ier, 0£. cit,, Kauptbaiuj




The following day the West Genua Foreign
t the broadcast wee e gesture of t . cxi will and no foreign policy
onangss were to be expected, Adenauer wee quite disappointed wwr
the Polieh reaction, and reportedly in a qpendary because President
aihower had expreeeed during hie recent visit Ml his
anxiety over West German difficulties in aaelioratjUig relatione
57
with Poland* ;tober 13, 1959 , Adenauer epoke at a luncheon
to the Foreign Press Association and ea. . an i'ur as he wee




^ -** ^^ndesta^. the opposition did not ,o»
ber a heated foreign, policy debate took place, Irst full
scale one in nineteen eontha on the pros and cone of the iiall-
59
stein Doctrine*" In addition to last, a Social Democrat
just returned from a visit to Warsaw and stated that Genaans
should acquaint theaselvee store fully with Polish sentiaent to*
ward the Germans* Polish mistrust was not surprising when ac-
count is taken of the fact Le out of every five was
57£he jgg&^hantian) i September V, 1959, p* 9*
^Sidney Oruson, "Adenauer Vetoes i^aste. >pe Ties, ,,
3M liSS York Tlacs . October 1U$ 1959, p* 13 1 and von Slegler,
op* oift *, wd II, p«




killed during World War II and that lialf of Warsaw^ populati
perimhed during thnt period.
Human, cultural and religious relationshi . ed Cross
agreements, previously described, functioned fairly satisfac-
torily except in the ease of Rumania. In late 1958 Rumania sus-
pended its agreement with West Germany as a result of the arrest
of two Rumanians by German authorities. A later suspension took
place in January of 1959, when West Germany applied economic sanc-
tions against da because of her vawi nesa to repatriate
62
German nationals* This did affect trade to some extern it
oably affected the Germans who ,-ave e- is
embargo lasted . ie months and was lifted or
1959. ^ But VJest German; 'jiued to experience difficulties.
One tactic adopted was the so callec iel - Trade
Humans - method originated by those Jewish people in Rumania
bought their way out of Rumania to emigrate to Israel. The Ger-
6L
mans have not been too successful In buying back their nationals.
vtural ties were slow to begin after the 1956 uprisings in
Eastern Europe and exchanges were Halted to arrangements made
(m^
Tho Times (London). September , . .
ontemporary Archives. 1?59-19<S0. p. 16
he Tir.es ( London ), Januar
imes. October 10, 19:' » .








among private groups. nee started, those contacts grew rapidly
although unsysteaatically. The West Germane hare preea exchange
arrangements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the West Ger-
man newspapers Frankfurter 4^aa»ine Zoitunfl and D£e. Wel£ have
correspondents in Warsaw, Similarly there are Polish reporters
in Bonn and Berlin* Newspaper correspondents are also exchanged
between West Germany and Yugoslavia* In 1957 technical arrange-
ments were concluded providing for the connection of West German
and East German television facilities, thus enabling Burovision
to be seen in Eastern Europe, * There are no reports, however,
on how frequently this arrangement is utilised.
Carefully selected West German moving pictures are shown
in Eastern Europe, and once a joint West German-Polish company
produced a moving picture which the Polish government refused to
si
show in Poland,
ice the advent of the 1960*8 an increased number of
book translations began to be published. In l?6l some 160
titles of Bast European literature were translated which
amounted to seven per cent of all foreign language literature
translated into German, Ninety seven Russian books were trans-
lated, followed by eighteen Csech and thirteen Polish. Over
600 West German titles have been translated into Russian, close
65«The Soviet Bloc and West Germany," Eastern
vol. 10, no, 6 (June, 1961), pp. 3-9«
^Ibid.
•-•", •.. P0| IM4MM ?- .- V 6<v -. :•-. HMHl tHfll .ta*v, «•».
NPMM '' * 1c /'r; ;•; u • r J •>._ . „- ; , n \ bit ; r>i «*"'A aJ Ml
roir £v»I*J UMBO J*M Ira
«w.> a** n vu rattf . M]owi :r»Jus id mm tS od
t oirli \Limmw& iwri no
VShvxc c*.;.-: -1 ww, .- tniot ? ••i bna 0ftmM -:».tao. ..:.
nil ' MfeRj iwoj H •»•"
I *MDA -A3»d BOO.
km mmXmmnS mm vwtmmll ammma *afi to mUU
rwtom inmo *».-; nw*t u.' Injun—
•
n3nd over 100 in in lesser numbers
e sixties
appears 1 at Germany leads the other wee iropean na-
In developing a .stern ©an art ai ;ra~
ture, J ' in January, 19^2
,
Industries,
l%, of whom much raore will be told later, umn|
. post-war ©xi.ibition of t-
,
rism i jrepe ai ireas*.
,od. u. . Isit-
For example. sorae 40,000
tourists visited I and one quarter consiste
st traffic is generally quite one sided, However, all
>ions are re the tourist
traffic in West 61 Bulgaria has been opened up
ri«t traf aat Ge. ravel to
resort tovms
:
as Varna, to c*set relatives, notabi;;
East Germany .s app^ e easiest way i -at
a family reunion.™
many ,
Current History , vol. 44, no, 260 (April, 1963), p. 223,
r.aand and Germany: The Beits Collect:. Jm
6, no. . ., . I .






In the religious field one might expect the Catholic faith
to be a bond between East Europe, particularly Poland, and West
Germany with a large percentage of its population and ita Chan-
cellor belonging to the Catholic fail . >wever, disputes have
arisen involving the Holy See Mho attempts to pursue a "neutral"
ae while trying to minister to Catholics living in the dis-
puted provinces east of the alsse rivers* A pre-World war
XI concordat between the Vatican and the German Reich provided
for German approval of all appointments of Catholic clergy. In
1953 the Polish government issued a similar decree for Poland, I
eluding former German territories* When Cardinal itynqpufcl, the
Polish Primate* was released in 1956 from jail he eventually suc-
ceeded in placing Polish bishops in the disputed territories which
led to West Germany initiating representations at the Vatican,
although fruitless* All statements made by the Pope are, of course,
scrutinised in order to determine whether he appears to recognize
the finality of the Dder-Neisee border or not*
If statements are studied it seems that to a large degree
they favor the present Polish boundary. The memorandiia of the
eight protectant leaders, discussed earlier, bears this out and
Catholic clergy as well favor thie border in their atateisents.











However, the Roman Catholie clergy is considered mere likely to
lend itself to conciliatory efforts between West Germany end East
72
Central Europe* and there are contacts between them across the
iron curtain.
In January, I960, Chancellor Adenauer visited the Pope and
stated in connection with this visit that the German people had a
divine mission In atMining the expanlon of evil from the east and
73
act as a guardian of the West. However, memories of World War II
have not yet subsided sufficiently Into the past, and comments of
74
The Advent oJ[ the sixties: foreign trade with polity
overtonee # As the sixties arrived Adenauer continued for acne
time to think primarily of Poland, as far as East Europe is con-
cerned* It should be recalled that an abortive summit oonferenoe
took place in May of I960 during which the question of Berlin and
Germany was to be aired. This, of course, colored German thinking
for some time. During the month of July the Polish government be-
came upset over statements made by Adenauer before refugee groups
and sent another round of notes requesting clarification on bor-
der issues to the NATO governments. Again in August Economics
72
"Treund, ojg. cit., p. 99«
'-'Arnaldo Cortesi, "Adenauer Sees a Divine Mission," The.
%S£ JiSSS* January 23. I960, p. 5.








Later rhart reiterated much of Adenauer* s earlier speeches,
namely that the German expellasa have the Beimatsrecht
the Gemane desire to live as peaceful neighbors with the Poles.
However, at about the time Prime Minister C ialivered
a major speech against Adenauer, in the summer of I960, he met Hers
Berthold Beite, the manager of the Krupp Industries, at a trade
fair in Posnan,
Berthold Doitz, the son of a bank teller, who becaraa the
president of a Hamburg insurance company, Joined the Krupp com-
plex in 195^ and became its general raana&er. This was rat
.« a non-Ruhr man entered the t olons of the Krupp manage-
men: ever, he was purposely selected and has become an ef-
ficient manager of the many phased industries Krupp participates
in. Br. Beita is a direct asis of his superior, Herr Era
The former plays the drums, likes jaws and the modem conveniences
of life - he owns a Hollywood-style home complete with a heated
swimming pool -, while Herr Krupp, a Bach fan, is described as an
76
Individual who is serious to the point of being dour.
During World War II Beit z served as an administrator of
the Qalielan oilfields in Poland from the autumn of 1939 until
"^von Siegler, oj>. cit«, Hauptband II, pp, 453-467*
passim. I960.




March 1%4. There lie gained the reputation among the Poles as a
person who tried to alleviate the rigors of occupation and is
credited with saving many lives. ^ Since becoming general manager
he has traveled extensively in Eastern Europe under the presdse
that ideology does not have anything to do with business, but busi-
ness is business and the company to do business with is Krupp,?*
i his easy going manner he has gained the confidence of many
East Europeans notably in Poland because of Ids war experience and
his ability to speak Polish.
It is believed that Beits received an invitation from
Cyrankiewies to visit Poland during the above-mentioned fe .
However, in November I960 he received a formal invitation and in
December he spent a week in Poland with Adenauer's encourag*-
ment.
January 10, 1961, Chancellor Adenauer revealed in a
speech that while i saw Beits had recommended that a perma-
nent German trade mission be established and trade between the
two nations increased* Adenauer stressed that Belts had conduct-
ed himself in a most "unexceptionable fashion." All in all,
^Germany's Polish Problem," T&e Iconcodst. vol. 198
(February 11, 1961), p. 573.
thur J. Glaen, nKrupp»s Manager Visits Warsaw, " The





Adenauer hoped that closer relations with Poland could be at-
tained.
a speech generated much speculation as to how far tue
Chancellor was willing to go to foster these closer relations.
The State Secretary of the Federal Press Office saw fit to em-
phasize the following day that too ouch meaning was read into the
Chanellor's speech and n as specific as a trade mission was
discussed as yet, but in any event, no territorial issues would be
ft
compromised. * January 19, 1961, a F Office official told
the Foreign Affairs Committee of :idest<; jloaatic
relations were contemplated, and two days later Secretary GomuXka
stated my ra et ween West Germany and would
depend on West German ad dssion that the uier-Neisserivers would be
the final border*
The day after Oonujtka's statement, January 22, Belts
appeared in Warsaw in his private plane, stayed thirty hours
and then flew back to West Germany, irihile in Warsaw he stated
that to improve Polish-German relations attempts she rot be
made in the economic and cultural field, for example, by i-
cluslon of a long term trade agreement. Any diplomatic relations
e Times. (London), January 11, 19 .
eg (London), January 12, 1961, p. 9.









were, for the timet being, outside the realm of reality, •* After
hie return official pronouncements in Bonn stated that he had gone
to Warsaw with governmental approval as an ambassador of good will,
but that hereinafter discussions on this subject were to be con-
ducted through official channels.
The next day, January 25, the Bonn government officially
3tated that West German-Polish negotiations were to begin in about
85
a month without comment as to agenda or location, ' while the Poles
were reputedly hopeful that a three year trade agreement could be
86
negotiated.
The talks were reportedly held in Paris where the Germans
proposed exchange of trade missions empowered to discharge consular
duties while the Poles insisted on full diplomatic relations with
recognition of the Oder-Heisse frontier, something the Bonn govern-
ment did not accept although some of the Social Democratic opposi-
87
tion did.
About a year later Berthold Beita offered a post-oortem of these
event8 in the Hamburg newspaper, Die 4eit , He stated that the
Poles desired a long term trade agreement, an agreement to erect
The Times (London), January 24, 1961, p. 8,
s
**von Siegler, op, cit,, Hauptband II, p, 543 j The Times
(London), January 25, 1961, p. 32} The New York Times , January 25,
1961, p. 3.
8
^The Hew York Times, January 26, 1961, p, 3.
The New York Times . January 27, 1961, p, 4,
^Sidney Gruson, "Warsaw at Odds with Bonn on Tie, " The Mew
York Times * February 23, 1961, p, 11,
3d ad 9tfaJ« our















a cultural center in Warsaw and, In general, the Poles wished to
explore the possibility of future diplomatic relations. This
latter issue prompted the West German Foreign Ministry to issue
statemento against diplomatic recognition} Beitz returned to
Warsaw hoping to smooth over m*fet«rs. The Ambassadors of the
two nations met in Copenhagen, but by then the Poles had in-
creased their demands and the atmosphere had deteriorated, Herr
Beits blamed, to some degree, the West German Foreign Office
for not aoce offers before they were raised, but
speculated that election year pressure and obstinate adherence
'irtillstein Doctrine exerted undue influence.
It Is generally believed that too much publicity and too
high expectations ruined the hones of achieving any success in
I
these negotiations*
At the end of March, 1961, the fourth meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact took place
and a short communique" was issued belaboring a German peace
90
treaty and a Berlin settlement in particular. In Warsaw dip-
lomatic observers opined that the coamunique' was intended to
induce the west to apply pressure on West Germany to come to
3%ditorial in The Timea (London), April 12, 1962, p. 15*
^Kastl Interview of March U, 1963,
^"Warsaw pact : Ho Fire Works in Hoseov o Economist ,
vol.
. 37 (April , 61), p. 117.









terms with its communist neighbors. To further enphasise the
point on March 30, 1961, a senior member of Polish coianunist
party* s Politburo assailed West Germany for faili sold
Beit as 1 a suggestions and said:
.3 rowdy policy of iionn is becoming irrit r cer-
tain circles in the 'West, which are
ment with our c ider our
tier to be a historically irrevocable fact, although they do
not want to recognise it formally.9*
In May of 1961 a report was r a multi-party
committee of the Bunriest is camiaittee had worked for several
years on a re-evaluation of West German Ostoolitik . It recommended
the goal of a free and united German;. >iendiy n is with
all of Eastern Europe and urged the Federal Government to nortaaliaai
relations with this area without forfeit Ltal German interests;
>mote cultural and human relations wit;: this area keeping the
psychological impediments of German-Polish re ships in rrdndj
to undertake within the governmental structure such institutional
measures that would ensure that eastern problems be accorded the
attention their significance requires; and that the Federal Re-
public must be in a position to take appropriate political action
in regard to the people of Eastern Europe, should the opportunity
93be favorable. This recommendation was unanimously adopted by the
Arthur J. Clsen, i: iio d Target of Hed rive, M
es, ril 1, I
, p, 3.
92Ibid.
Uaksch, o£. cit., p. 35.
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Bundestag on June 14, 1961.
,.s was one of the last acts of the third Bund—to .
tions took place during the summer and a new Bundestag and new
cabinet reconvened in the rail, a subject for the next chanter*
To color the election campaign the oooBtunists erected the
wall in August 1961* However, before leaving tale time period an
overview of West teMUjpf• greatest inroads into Eastern Europe
should be analysed, namely ooanereiax relations*
tiSjsfc Germany end
Trade agreements have mad* up the bulk of satisfactory
lations between East Central Europe and Vest Germany, although the
German governments feeling lately seems to be that the Germans
do this trading because it is politically desirable although eeo-
95
noniic -lly not mandatory. The annual trad* agreements have not
been concluded perfunctorily as evideneed by the numerous short-
term extensions, its described in the case of Rumania, a trade
agreement can be used ae a lever to attain other ends. However,
a three year trade agreement was concluded between the Soviet
96
Union and 'jsJest Germany in January 19 Of course, the two na-
tions have diplomatic relations which facilitated inclusion
thereof*
^Kastl Interview of March jJ,» 196?.







Figure* 1-7 give a survey of the trade between Meet Ger-
many and Best Central ourop© sine© 1950. Although beyond the scope
Me thesis, some statistics oi trade with the USSR have been
included for the sake of unit:- and comparison*
Before examining these statistics a resume' of trad© with
ania will be given inasmuch as trade wi .. 3 nation has ooen
eo negligeabls that graphic presentation is not feasible. Sine©
1953 "est German/ has imported a yearly total ods ran
from |j reaehi , 1 turn
exports free* West Germany have uited bet wee:
JO a year, thane transactions comprise less
»*est Germany' a foreign trade, -Vest German exports are primarily
composed of pharmaceuticals and building fixtures*
In Figures 1*7 the general iopreasian Is of a gradual
increase in trade in both directions as far as the satellites are
07
To compile these and succeeding statistics information
has been extracted passim from the following sources
t
. German Federal Republic, Statistis. ndesamt,
fur d
R leabaacni * . , 1959 and
ade statistics are shown in have con-
veniently been recomputed at f a dollar. All percentages
quoted for German imports and exports and all West trade
values ahem in Figures 1-7 are tl iven in this source.
2* United Nations, Secretariat of --jcieale Commission
• •etin for Europe* . &V
though these figuree appear in a Unite* is publication, they
originate ooaraunist sources, which t! Ir credit-:
. Federati rodna repubUka Jugoslawija
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^3T GSRIJU: ^RADi r?" CZEVlOSLOVk}'.
it The vnbroken line represents +ije p^ centa -e
German export? destined f'or Czechoslovakia; »imilarly
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concerned, While examining these it most be remembered that the
volume of West German foreign trade has increased drastically dur-
ing the fifties with the value of exports surging far ahead of
imports since 1953 > giving West Germany a very favorable trade
balance. In 1950 German imports were valued at about £2.3 billion,
in 1961 $11 billion; in 1950 German exports slightly exceeded $2
billion, in 1961 112,7 billion.
In 1955 a marked increase in German trade with Poland, the
Soviet Union and Chechoslovakia took place, while in the ease of
ttungary* Rumania and Bulgaria yearly volumes did not vary too such,
but some gradual increases are discernable. The trade embargo im-
posed on Rumania in 1959 is noticeable in Figure 5* Especially
since the advent of the sixties German exports have exceeded im-
ports in value with the striking exception of Poland which is gain-
ing valuable Western currency in its trade with West Germany.
Bulgaria and Albania are the most insignificant trading partners,
while trade with the USSR has expanded rapidly. The percentages
of satellite trade with West Germany are small and seemingly in-
significant, but since West Germany exports goods and materials
needed for expanding the various national industries these figures
become more significant.
The situation with Yugoslavia is most striking. Her own
statistics show her high dependence on West Germany and Figure 7
shows that continuously West Germany has exported far more to this
country than she has imported} in fact in the sixties the export
art* ted* hfttmm w*H yilafeasca allrfW
-<u* a*-tt bataar «^ a^t-mi nmo 4aaV lo aanlov
!• Atada 1/ astlav lijr ar>.
* >MM v i
-
; v Eg or. ] * * iioqrdt
T
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} baaaacot ^
MJM*ntli haifiaiT i
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.
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values are more than double tee import values, giving an impression
that Xugoelavia is on the West German dole. In the post-war period
Yugoslavia has had a very unfavorable balance of trade. In the
fifties Yugoslavia was West Germany's largest Eae -wan trading
partner except for Poland in 1956. Sines I960 the USSR has replaced
Yugoslavia in this respect*
In surveying commodities traded* West Germany exports to all
these countries mainly iron and steel, chemicals and a diverse
number of items collectively called machinery. In turn, West Ger-
many imports the following main commodities from:
1. Bulgaria: produce, dairy products and tobacco;
2. Czechoslovakia: coal, textiles, glass, dairy products
and produce;
3. Hungary: meat, produce and some petroleum;
4* Poland: coal, meat and produce, basic chemicals and
badMrj
5. The US:Ji: petroleum, raw materials, hides, lumber and
grain; and
6. Yugoslavia: bauxite and hops.
SummarysmsmmsMb
Apart from a steady expansion of trade with East Central
Europe from 1956 to 1961, West Germany has had a generally frus-
trating experience trying to come to terms with its eastern neigh-
bors. The 1956 uprisings in Eastern Europe presented new oppor-
tunities which the Germans would have liked to exploit, and had
not Tito's recognition of East Germany taken place a year later,
West German relations with the satellites may hare improved.
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effect upon West Germany* The coaaunist propaganda barrage end
the arman an<: In issues on the arm aide, and Meal Ger-
man doctrines such as the Halletein Doctrine and the Belfastsrecht
Doctrine on the other, succeeded in keeping the Iron curtain in-
tact. In foreign ministers' meetings the Vest Germane wore re-
luctant to depart fros previously stated positions.
Aside from official .natters sons success has been achieved
in addition to trade relations in repatriation of separated family
members through Ked Cross arrangements. Towards the end of I
period, increased cultural relationships occurred, evidencing
popular interest in /'.astern Europe,






OH September 17* 1V61 was the election of the fourth West
German Bund—teg which opened one month later, while Adenauer's
new cabinet did not emarge until the following month. In the
election results the moot noteworthy fact la that for the first
time in the history of the Federal Republic more Social Demo-
cratic votes were oast than Christian Democratic, which was re-
flected in the composition of the Bundestag . Adenauer had suf-
ficient support from other parties to form a coalition govern-
ment. The composition of his cabinet changed to some extent,
notably, for the purposes of this thesis, in that Schroeder suc-
ceeded von Brentano as foreign minister. Before this Sehroedmr
was iinister of the Interior; upon his appointment von Brentano
became ehainnan of the Commission of the European Economic Com-
munity in Brussels.
Search for jigg So^utfrons
At the end of October during the transition from one cabinet
to another It was reported that the 'West German government was
studying the possibility of resurrecting the 1959 plans for non-
aggression pacts. At the end of the session of the third Bundestag.







c ur SI TrndSon*
government was urged to adopt a more positive and active outlook
toward its eastern neighbors. Furthermore, a new administration
governed in Washington and considerable discussion subject
oust have passed between Bonn and Washington.
Adenauer's concern over concluding non-aggression pacts re-
sulted from the belief that this might limit diplomatic maneuver-
ability in the discussion of territorial issues and might be
step toward future diplomatic recognition. On many occasions the
West German government had stated unilaterally that force was not
m used in solving the eastern problems. However, if instead of
concluding a formal non-aggression pact, simultaneous publication
of declarations of non-aggression by West Germany and the satellite
governments oould be arranged through third parties, one could
circumvent the above-mentioned objections to direct negotiation.
Furthermore these declarations could be deposited with the United
Nations for added emphasis. This plan reportedly originated fron
Ambassador Grewe with the support of Chancellor Adenauer.
Any such declarations have not as yet been forthcoK&n .
However, in the realm of private agreement the West Germans took
a step that hitherto had not been contemplated. In November 1961
the International Bed Gross, acting for the German Red Cross, ar-
ranged with the Polish Ked Cross for monetary compensation to
Polish women who had been victia&sed by Hasi medical experiment
a
^David Binder, "Bonn Hay Offer Reds a Peace /ow," Th£ Efew
York Times, October 29, 1961, p. 1} and The Times (London) October
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during World War II. Seventy-three Polish women were allowed
compensations ranging from y6,250 - f10,00 .
I the official aide, one af the new Fore. datar , a
first undertaking* was to aat up a new at&ff to re-evaluate West
Germany's . aitik, his pragmatic approach served as a guide
to this uew staff composed of East European experts, and Chan-
cellor Adenauer predicted a more active JstpollLiK in a Haw
,b r % 9 -- nee .
In Hay of Lt is reported that Berthold Beits, the
unofficial roving West German good will ambassador to East Cen-
tral Europe, extended sons feelers to Hungary and Romania whi
L
led to ambassadorial talks in third countries* In June and
October Dr. Schroeder delivered major foreign policy speeches
quoted above^calling for closer contacts with Astern Europe in
spite of satellite resistance*
During the summer and early fall West Germany and Hungary
were reported to be quietly negotiating closer trade relations.
The Hungarians, as well as other agricultural satellite nations,
were concerned over the growing tariff barriers erected around
agricultural imports into the Common Market nations. Since West
K.eesinft ! • staporar;/ fj -1962, . 3 >32.
ieman* 22* P-r *» P* 22; an<i DtiewanowsKi, pja. cit,,
**%hSL ti»es (London), September 29, 1962, p« 7«
5









Germany follows Great Britain as leading food importer this is a
serious subjest Tor the Germans as well. ' However , the talks
broke down over trade missions. The ians wanted to have their
trade missions in West Germany to enjoy consular privileges, but
I would have been too liberal an interpretation of the Hallstsin
rine as far as the West Germans were concerned. Eut both par-
7
ties departed leaving the door ajar.
During these negotiations a younger member, quite influen-
tial in the Foreign Affairs Coawittee of the Bundestag and vri
the Latin-sounding name of Majonica, had urged Dr. Schroeder in
an article to improve relations with East Central Europe by estab-
lishing trade missions in those satellite nations which already
had trade representatives in West Germany • As it turned out
^nica'e wishes wsre fulfilled to some extent.
A >&& Gm***j&ak Cwftmft Su*W«an Aflrfsant
Although the Hungarian talks wore not successful Schroeder
was not rebuffed. In his October, 1962, speech he hinted at
closer commercial relationships!
arah Gainharn, "Drang nach Oaten?", The Spectator , vol.
209, no. 700? (October 12, 1962), p. 545.
7The Times (London). September 29, 196;
, ,?,










Ws are examining the possibility of establishing commercial
representations in Eastern Europe; for the time being this has
only limited objectives* we are considering first steps along
the way to a better relationship between ourselves and East
European States*
9
In January 1961 the Poles had sought to gain a long-term
agreement, timing their request to the Beits trips and just follow*
log the conclusion of the three-year Soviet-West German trade agree*
ment. In Hay 1961 the '.-test Germans expressed their willingness to
do so, but apparently these efforts did not materialise. Shortly
after Sehroeder's October speech, negotiations were quietly started
on iJoveraber 29, 1962 with the Poles and they lasted until March 1963.
The negotiations produced a tiiree-year trade agreement on
i-iaroh 7, 1963, which was somewhat expected, but in addition, the
two nations agreed to the establishment of a west Gercian trade
mission in Warsaw which would administer the agreement. The West
German government stressed the fact that this was a concrete re-
sult of the Bundest ag's May 1961 proposal and that it was willing
to enter into similar agreements with other East European nations,
13
notably Hungary. However, the Chancellor pointed out that this
agreement with the Poles in no way touched upon the Oder-Neisse
12frontier problem*
9schroeder, Peace, Freedom, Order, p. Ift,
*%*£ Ttoea (London), I4ay 14, 1961, p. 3.
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In examining the provisions of this agreement It appears
th ah exports to West Germany totaling $116 million annually
and 3 jmowing an increase of about one-third of rrevioue yearly
amounts viJ. exceed West Oenaan exports to Poland, amount in;; to
s97«5 million annually, by seas fifteen percent, which will *ive
Poland a very favorable balance of trade and a supply of western
13
currency.
Regarding commodities to be traded sane detailed provisions
iterate as Grerssan exports a wider variety of finished goods,
chemical and pharmaceutical product* Cerrous metals, f 're
resistant products, agrarian commodities, such as breedlnr cattle,
mi fishing products, © items listed in the previous
te . IB addition to earlier mentioned items the Poles will
export rollinr mill, heavy and light industrial products and
various raw materials. At about the time the trade negotiations
were going on, the Krupp industries were erecting a large petro-
leum-based synthetic fiber plant in Pinsk in the USSR, and it is
expected that similar slants may be constructed in the Polish
flheirieal center of Plock where a forty-inch pipeline from the
11.
\ terminates.
^"New Trade Accord: wards Better Relations with
Poland", The 'A:etin, vol, 11, no. 10 larch L2, 1963), p. 1.
Unless otherwise footnoted, this article is the chief source of
treaty provisions*
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The trade agreement also provided for ocean traneportation
of the goods to be traded, which will circusnre- land route
agh East Germany, In addition,, iiead of the Polish trade
mission in Frankfurt and the head of the German mission in Warsaw
will jointly form a mixed commission to aid in the execution of
this agreement. The German mission will be composed of senior
officials, but without full diplomatic privileges*
Shortly after the conclusion of this agreement, Dr.
roeder stated in an interview that he attached political
value to it inasmuch as it improved relations with Poland.
added that the Germans "have gone to great effort in accomplish-
ing this agreement" and that the negotiations were ch uv.cter-
15
ised by "open-c&ndedness and slnoerit all of which points
to considerable bargaining on both sides. The Fore lster
emphasized that these i proved economic found ad
Lher steps such as better cultural and human contac
Finally he warr- b conjecture about future developments
- bo based on this agreement,
Xn conoludi: s agreement West Gernany helped Poland
scale the agricultural tariff wall surrounding the six Ccmmon
v; Trade Accord: A step Towards Better Relations with









Market nations and gave hor a favorable trade balance. Dm
West German government also felt, unofficially, that this agree-
ment has a tendeney to isolate East Germany, since the West Ger-
mans are buying up Polish goods which otherwise could have been
lfl
sold to the East Germans*
The most difficult Issue in the trade negotiations ap-
peared to be the German insistence on sans limited diplomatic
immunities for the members of the trade mission in Warsaw. The
problem was solved, according to diplomatic informants, by an un-
published protocol wherein the Poles agreed "on a de facto basis"
to personal immunity and other limited privileges, something the
19
Poles referred to as "backdoor diplomacy".
The Poles also agreed informally to let a few Germans re-
20
turn to Polish territories for humanitarian reasons* For the
Polish population this agreement will constitute a step in their
J
minds toward a reconciliation between West Germany and Poland.
17Editorial U a* I2& Times (Western Edition),
March 15, 1963, p. 6.
^"Window To The East," Wswjwsok. vol. 61, no. 11 (March 18,
1963), p. 46.
^Arthur J. Qlsen, "Poland to Admit Some Germans to Dis-
puted Lands as Gesture," The New York Times (Western Edition
Marsh 25, 1963, p. 2.
i
^Korbonski Interview.
•'» *»*• " pjlfijil fife ' • '"^ Mi «9rtM iq btdftjUduq
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ice then there has been speculation la the press about
similar agreements being negotiated, since the foot is now in the
, and it is lori.eai to assume that further accords of this type
will be concluded* To quote The Ecor
. . .
Herr Schroder is continuing quietly to prospect the
possibilities of eventually reaching, similar agreements with
Slovakia and Rumania,2*
Official comment on this statement is one of non denial with
the added remark that Csechoslovakia and Hansnla should reverse
places in this statement .^ In light of events this is a quite
logical order. The Hungarian door was left ajar, as Txreviously
stated. In the current Soviet-Rumanian tiff over allocation
labor in the oosninist economic sphere, it would seem adv
to the West Germans to take the initiative and extend their Influ-
ence, Berthold Belts must see profitable sales in these situations,
Evidencing nope for toprovinp future relationships viith East
Central Europe, Foreif ster Schroeder expressed himself in the
following manner on June 28, 1963, in Duesseldcrf t
The agreements which we have recently e ed with the
>vermaent are, then, the first sU L-hls direc-
tion. We were moved to this policy by the wish to re-estab-
lish officii -,ucta with the states irope, to
ease the atmosphere, to establish human znd cultural relations
and to further understandinjtj; for our mutual problems.
22,,Tale of a Tube," The Economist, vol, 206, no, 6ZkO
(Marsh 30, 1963), p, 1213.
*% ntervirw of July !£, 1963 .
ii'.-0 y *. XULK
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We neither wish to isolate ourselves from the East Euro-
pean nations nor do they from us. Although the political
dividends at present are low we still hope that in the course
of time such contacts outside ideology may also be politically






80 far the discussion of West German-Bast Central European
relations has been contained within the narrow framework of the
nations concerned. However, it is necessary to examine the ef-
fects of post-war European evolution more closely to determine
its impact on the nations under discussion.
Brief mention has been made of Germany1s participation In
the many West European regional organisations and of the existence
of the Warsaw Pact. T 14 war with its ree Xitary
anizations has been discussed in the chapter concerning Impedi-
ments. As West Germany's influence in East Central a has
been most far-reaching in the economic field it becomes necessary
to note the influence of economic regional organisations*
West ./•« participation in the prospering Communities
of the Six has been touched upon, but nothing has been said of
the communist counterpart, the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance, abbreviated CEHA or CO'"E . ;his organization was
2V*erhard Schroder, "Points of Main Emphasis in German Foreign






created In 1949 as a countermove to the Marshall aid program, but
It was not utilised effectively until the fifties after Stalin's
death. In a May CO;£CGN can be considered supra-national especially
as far as the satellites are concerned in that the USSR as the
senior member dominates the organisation. Yugoslavia is not a
of GEMA. However, its charter has formally included pro-
visions for establishing and maintaining relations with other Inter-
25
national organisations*
In COHSCGH the USSR directed the satellites to a policy of
"division of labor" by which each satellite is to specialise on
what it sen produce best for the benefit of all* However, ooramu-
nist economic management has left much to be desired and many
economic problems have arisen. In its relations with the non-
communist world, QBfft has met a strong competitor In the KSC or
the Common Market. From the communist idelogical point of view
the free world refused most irritatingly to fall into economic
decay, and Khrushchev has hurled much propaganda at the growing
Common Market which in communist eyes has become an economic aggres-
sor. In September, 1962, it appeared th*t Khruschev'e thinking al-
tered to subscribe to the slogan - if you can't lick thorn, join them -
since he dropped hints that the USSR was going to evaluate its views
2
*Article 11 as quoted In Ruth C, Lawson, Internation Region-
al Organisations (Mew Yorkt Frederick A. Fraeger/I
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on "capitalist 1* economics. Western Europe is the closest supplier
of much advanced technological Information that the Eastern bloc does
27
not have and, in addition, western currency is always needed.
Nations have unsuccessfully tried to follow a pol
s can be equally difficult for an oconoale regional5 i.
satellite trade with s.eat Qerraany, o r free nations, cones
under Kremlin scrutiny.
In the Home Treaty of 1957 establishing the Cosrapn Market,
provisions exist whereby in the transitional oeriod two of the main
institutions of the Coraraunity, the Commission and the Council, be-
come more and more involved in harmonising commercial policy with
third countries. Consequently, West Germany has had to coordinate
29
Its quotas in trade with a supranational organisation. After the
expiration of the transitional period, presently planned for Deccm-
, 30ber 31 > 1969, the above institutions will conduct trade negotiations
'fohc New York Times . September 2, 1962, p. 7.
2
'Harry Sehwarts, "Soviet is dressing Hard on ic 33",
epteab
^.uropean Com j& 3eorv
oean Economic Ccwram.
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, passim. Cited hereinafter as the Ilogie Treaty.
^Kastl Interview of March 1,1, 1963.
30
unity Information Servic ,
(Brussels: Member, 1962), p. 13.
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with third countries. The transitional period ia divided into three
four-year stages; the second stage ease into being on January 1, 1962
,
32
to expire December 31 , 1965 j unless it is prolonged by the Council.
During this stage the Commission of the WO has issued these inetr
tions on trade between members and the communist bloc:
Apart from multilateral trade with the Western World, there
ia also bilateral trade with the Eastern bloc countries. Na-
tional quotas and liberalisation lists for these countries will
be replaced by quotas negotiated or fixed according to Community
ocedure. The liberalisation lists drawn up autonomously by
.e various countries will be pooled and replaced by a Community
list. The Commission will submit its Initial proposals on this
subject before the end of 1963.33
Thus, West Gemany will become more and more dependent upon
the decision of others in her non-KISC trade. This could lead to
both adverse and favorable relations between West Germany and the
satellite states, adverse if the two economic organizations insist
on minimum relationships and high tariff walls, thereby forcing the
satellites even more into the communist camp and widening the gap
between themselves and West Germany; or favorable, if the two organi-
sations can agree to some trade with one another. At present, for
example , the SEC agricultural tariffs are exerting a detrimental
effect on eastern trade and on trade with the free world as well.
31
i^SS Treat** article 113.
European Community Information Service, loc . pit .
^%uropean Economic Community Commission, Memorandum of the
Commission on the Action Programme of the Communita for the Second
Sjsfige (Brussels : Publis: Services of the European Communities,
8067*/5AlA962/5, 24 Oct. 1962), p. 78.
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As seen in the previous chapter satellite trade with Western Europe
is quite substantial, A few months before Khrushchev* s second
thoughts about the ESC Dr. Schroeder said the following about closer
economic ties between the two blocs:
The Common Market is not levelled against the Soviet Union
or the other East bloc states..... The upward trend in our
large market area will step up the demand for goods from other
countries, including those belonging to the Eastern bloc, and
be instrumental in increasing trade not only with the rest of
the Free World, but also with East European countries,
progress made by the Common Market has already begun to have a
beneficial effect on East-fcest trading. The total turnover in
trade between the EEC countries m4 East European states rose
from 1953-1961 by approximately 67%.
Even in our memorandum to the Soviet Government of 21st,
February [JL962) , we pointed out that we mid imagine i ter
measure of co-operation between the great economic potential of
the Common Market and the East bloc states which would be of
considerable benefit to all concerned,34
The population in last Central E-arope is well aware of the
results of the Common Market, Particularly astounding is the growth
of West Germany from utter ruin to wealth. This organization is
exerting a powerful attraction and is a shining example of contra-
diction to the communists who claim that their economic system iB
superior. Of course, any increase in EEC trade that the satellites
would like to engage in is subject to ON approval.
at present both officials of the Common Market and business-
men in its area are realizing the possibilities of trade with
^SciiToeder, Gernaiiy
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easter.i Europe.-* In January, 1963* after Great Britain* 8 applica-
tion for Omasa Market membership had been turned down, de Gaulle
concluded a three-year trade agreement with the USSR* and the Benelux
37
countries reached a similar agreement with Hungax . a, a num-
ber of long tens trade agreements with the bloc nations is an estab-
lished fact, initiating a new trend* Regarding future developments
any prognostications will enter the area of conjecture* An authority
en Eastern Burop* has expressed himself in the following manner as
he projects present trends into the future:
The Common Market can be a powerful vehicle for attracting
Europe and eventually Russia, but in the short run there is
danger that it will actually intensify the political and eco-
nomic integration of the Soviet pact of the Communist world*
By making trade with the West more difficult, it has already
forced some of the East European states into greater economic
dependence on the Soviet Union. It is for this reason impor-
tant to consider ways in which an economically united and in-
creasingly powerful Europe could eventually extend the ha
of cooperation to the States united in A new European-
based version of the Marshall Plan could be envisaged as a
step toward the unification of all of Europe, Thus Eastern
Europe as a unit, now more industrialized and increasingly in-
tegrated in CEMA, could be encouraged to relate itself step by
step to an ail-European economic development^at first in very
loose form, later in a more binding fashion.™
3%ditorial in The, New lork Times (Western Edition),
Maren 15, 1963, p. 6$ and "Business Around the World," U.S.
j*ews and World Report, vol, 54, no, 25 Uune 24, 1963), ] '".
101-102.
37Profeesor Jan Hubert Wsselakl, lecture March 25, 1963 in
Seminar on Eastern Europe, Course 33 •739, American Universix
Washington, B.C.
^Zbigniew K. Brsesineki, "Threat and Opportunity in the















Since the assumption of office of the fourth West German
cabinet efforts to establish closer relation* with the East Central
opsan nations have met with more success than previously* The
conclusion of the three-year trade agreement with Poland has ^iven
West Germany a stronger foothold in East Central Europe wit' the
chance of similar future agreements wit itions of this
area. Concomitantly, West German participation in western Euro-
pean regional organisations and the growth of this regionalism have
contributed toward showing to Ear peans the fruits West Ger-
many has gained from membership therein*
.-—
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From the presentation in the previous chapters the trends of
contemporary West German relations with Bast Central Europe De-
cease quite evident.
West Germany has found it most difficult to develop a
political outlook toward the East acceptable to all Germans*
The West German government has seen fit to develop the Hallstein
Doctrine as a measure to prevent or at least minimise universal
acceptance of two Germanics, the Soviet IJnion being the only na-
tion to do so de .jure at present. Thus, diplomatic relations -will
not be established with East Central European nations without modifi-
cations to this doctrine. There is in Germany considerable oppo-
sition to it and many think it should be discarded. To this is
added the Hsimatsrecht Doctrine wherein the refugee groups 1 interests
are recognized, but vfcich has a disquieting effect on West Germany's
nearest eastern neighbors*
it this in mind West German foreign policy towards Osteuropa
becomes subject to so much restriction that at times it almost ap-
proaches the vanishing point. As has been shown, the West Germans 1
stated foreign policy in East Europe has been to promote friendly
and neighborly relations. Before gaining full sovereignty there
was no activity in this field except with Yugoslavia. Diplomatic
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relations were established in the early fifties while Tito was
persona non grata in the communist camp. The uprisings in Western
..-urope in the autumn of 1956 left their impressions on the Germans
as on the rest of the world, and the West German government began
wly to reconsider its position vis-a-vis Poland in particular,
however, when Tito recognised East Germany in the fall of 1957* the
West German government apparently realized it was futile to deal
with communist governments and, thus, refrained from any overtures
for some time. Under Western prodding, non-aggression pacts with
satellite nations were considered, but finally rejected By the Ger-
mans. Feelers such as the 1959 anniversary speech by Adenauer and
the Beitz missions in early 1961 also came to naught. With a new
administration and a new foreign minister responding to increased
Social and Free Democratic representation in the Bundestag , an
element of more flexibility was introduced into West Germany's
Qstpolitik. which has evidenced itself by the establishment of a
permanent West German trade mission in Warsaw, and the conclusion
of a three-year trade agreement in March of 1963. It will be re-
called that Berthold Beits attempted to achieve this in his 1960/
1961 journeys to Warsaw.
Xn order to present the other side of the picture, the satel-
lites have expressed their willingness to open diplomatic relations
with West Germany. Since taey all recognise East Germany and in
addition, Poland has insisted on West German acquiescence on the
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However, the satellites as wall as their control center, the Soviet
Union, have almost continually maintained a propaganda barrage
concerning reeurging German militarism, the conclusion of a separate
peace treaty with the East German regime, and the Berlin situation,
all of which exert deterrent effects.
The critique of Vcest German tstpolitik has been ft.
osgewski stated that there had been none in support of which
an argument can be raised if one evaluates only in terms of con-
crete achievements* Gerald Freund maintains that Vest Germany's
Ostpolitik should be anm of minimising the fear of Germany and
Germans, especially in Poland, and to this end the Gder-^eiese
2line should be recognised and the Hallstein Doctrine abolished*
- Infest German governmental response to similar pressures,
notably from the political opposition, a Gerisan writer observed
that Ma painful process of reorientation from below,... is going
on under the deceptive cover of official lethar. :„/-."
bh all the obstacles present est German effort to
age its image among the eastern population must indeed be monu-
mental. Frem observation of past endeavours it owmm that the
Adenauer-von jjretano team for guiding Ostpolitik has been more
se than the Adenauer-Schroeder combination, since in the
de supra . Chapter I , . 49
•
freund, eg, cit., p. 253-









latter instance a more pragmatic approach has been undertaken and
more flexibility has been Introduced. The Adenauer anniversary
epeeeh of 1959 is a case in pc denauar made a msaber ol
-atory remarks, but. was thoroughly rebuffed by tho Polish -
nist government. Again in I960 and 1961 feelers were extended in
rm of the Beltz visits, if the West German goveromc been
less cautious and had actec ^ore dispatch t «s.
nan trade mission in Warsaw stay have been two years ol ie
later* s reaction to Adenauer's speech of August 31,
9 was really quite predictable. He likened the agaeech to a
wedge driven between Poland and ->viot be the
result, if Eaate- opeans were to trust such atatessants,
quently, the communist hold over the population would be in some
small measure loosened and in turn free world aims advanced* ow-
ever, as will be discussed below this nay be happening now, inasmuch
as tne population of East Europe is not entirely ignorant of MmA
German aehieveraents in Western Europe*
Since West Germany is a dose neighbor ef East Central Europe,
and sinee West German interest in eastern affaire is keen and prob-
ably greater than in other Western European countries, and historic-
ally has been so, this nation is the logical one to extend the ideas
of the West back into the "borderlands of Western Civilisation,"
No do ropeans v o will live in oeace with West
Germany if they could freely choose to do so, as long as they could
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almost becomes necessary under present circumstances, for West Ger-
many to force its good intenti on the East Europeans, surmount-
ing communist hindrances.
Tho West Germans have taade the greatest inroads .-.st
ough trade, luring; the fifties trade was developed through
unofficial channels by the Qstauaschusa ^ c trac bs>
nents themselves were signed by a cabinet minister, usually %
Minister >f Agriculture. Since the Geraaans export much precision
Machinery and equipment and iron and steel, the importance of Ger-
man trade is considerable, since the loss of it would require the
East Europeans to rely more heavily on what oviets are willing
to offer in this field. As inferred earlier, the loss of this trade
Id hamper their national industries.
The advocates of the theory of functionalist as the vehicle
for maintaining slid furthering international peace and security
&nt to .. economic relations between Viest CJermany and
East Central Europe as a ~e basis for closer collaboration
between East and West
,
itable business has an affinity for
bridging gaps where politics cannot. Business spearheaded the first
penetration of the :urtain /And politics slowly follo'^od suit*
__,
composed of business interests, exerts a s
"issure on the West German govcrittienfc
.
.jqqm-
tion i ,: to observe the ti >f two events, described
above separa, between the two beita visits ;ember
I960 and January 1961, the first three-year trade agreement concluded
otr
hilt—










by West Germany and a eommunist state took place 5 this event must
have seemed auspicious to the satellites. However* trade alone
did not put the pressure on politics. As appreciable amount of
political force came from the tfundestaff « as has been seen, where
Social Democrats have led attempts to ameliorate relations with
j.
Eastern Europe. Wensel Jakeeh's report, cited above, is one of
the most important recommendations in this respect, and so acknow-
ledged by th?» West German covernraent. The composition of the fourth
Basestag also contributed in this respect, inasmuch as the
ceilor's party diminished in size therein.
To the free world this East-West trade will be beneficial
inasmuch as West Germany contributes to a greater East European
dependence upon trie West. As West German trade increases more
opportunities will develop for interrelations across the iron cur-
tain.
Although not exemplified in concrete West Gernsan-^ast Cen-
tral ICuropean relations, West German experiences in post-war Western
Europe has affected the opinions and outlook of Eastern Europeans.
About ten years ago Professor oeton- .at son, an expert on East Euro-
pean history, stated that West Germany had to associate herself with
the West for national survival and that West Germans should realize
that West European solidarity was necessary in the cold war.
This West Germany has done, and on© German authority considers this
Vide supra. Ch. ft9 p. 97.
'Hugh Seton-lVatson, "Easter
The Twentieth Century , vol. 153 (Harch, 1953), pp. 200 and 202.
5 n Europe and the German Problem,"
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nation the moat European-minded of the members of the Caramon Mar-
ket.6 A. the MMta of the^ Europe «rt«r« loator. bay.
pointed out? the development of West Germany since the end of the
war serves as a concrete example of progress in the free world,
on the other hand, the non-comsaunity trade of the Cobkk at
can have detrimental effects should this organization enclose it-
self with economic barriers and besoms as colorfully expressed
I
an emigre leader "an economic ghetto" * Furthermore, President
ds Gaulle's view of a PEuroos des qatries has put a brake on Euro-
pean Integration and it is difficult to predict what the out cons
is going to be, although It is liksly that the unification drive
will continue since this is supported by the majority. West Ger-
nan-fiaet Central European relationships would suffer should Euro-
pean integration besoms retarded. To East Europeans, European in-
tegration has become attractive and a goal they would like to attain
some day* Although the members of the Com-.amities of the Six still
call themselves sovereign nations large sectors of their sovereignty
has been yielded to supranational organisations. Thus, especially
those East Europeans who suffered lost during World car II under f«a*i
Germany, should feel that present day West Germany is restricted in
Carl G. Anthon* "Gtorraany and the European Coraaunity,"
Current History , vol, 3'j, no* 221 (January, 1961), p. 12.
















her maneuverability and cannot always aet independently; this ahould
alleviate ouch fear of a revival of any German imperialistio trends*
To refer back to Professor arzesinski, his estimate on the
future Eastern Europe is expressed in this manner i
in promoting the evolution of Eastern Lurope, an essential
role will inevitably be played by Western Europe. As de Gaulle
has unintentionally demonstrated, the concept of &uropaan ^mity
is perhaps the most potent force on the Continent today, and it
is gradually beginning to be felt in -ussia also,,..
Eastern Europe can serve as a transmission belt reach::
even wider circles of Soviet society , especially the intel-
ligentsia. And as China increasingly repels, it gradually
pushes Hussia toward Europe and sets the stage for perha
an entirely new historical relationship."
So far this bold statement has been essentially correct. The
Chinese have seriously repelled the Russians and the Soviet Union
has been pushed westward, rather then towards Kurope, as the in-
itialling of the recent test ban treaty has evidenced.
As concluding remarks the following observations can be
summarised and deduced from the factual presentation and the dis-
cussion of events and issues in this thesis.
It is believed that West Germany has had an Ostpolitlk.
It has impediments, some self-imposed by German produced doc-
trines, others by the Cold War. It has expressed itself through
economic relations which have increased steadily ever since the
early fifties. Attempts at political adjustments have not taken
place until recently although the desire for amelioration of rela-
tions is not new. Thus, business has proceeded politics.
*Brseainski, "Threat and Opportuaity in the Communist Schism,"
pp. 521-522, frasslm.
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Whatever political exploration Knt Germany has naie up to
now In East Central Europe, tne thought that the international posi-
tion of «&et Germany should not be enhanced thereby has always been
paramount. j£ equal importance Viae been the issue of not approving
any finality of present Viestem borders of Poland,
In its relations with East Central Europe 'stoat Germany has
benefited indirectly from its successes in West European Integra*
tion and its reconciliation with France, since this evolution iias
sade great Impressions upon the population at large in the East
serving to create a new image of Germany although the eonnunist
propaganda barrier attsmpts to conceal this,
line is in favor of the East Europeans. The Gdsr-Heisse
frontier has been in existence for eighteen /ears and so has
East German,/, all of which assumes an outlook of permanence
.
Although it is doubtful if the Geraan population will ever recon-
cile themselves to two permanent Gersaaniee, the present Oder-
tteisss frontier is considered settled in the minds of many West
Germans, as they urge their government to accept it also.
German public interest in eastern affairs and culture has
begun to increase since the advent of the sixties and if travel
restrictions are no .tencd, an increase of contacts will in-
evitably take place*
If present evolutionary trends continue assisted by the
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